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NEC V. INTEL: WILL HARDWARE BE DRAWN
INTO THE BLACK HOLE OF COPYRIGHT?
Robert C. Hincldey*
I. STATUS OF THE CASE
In this case, fied in the Northern District of California in De-
cember, 1984, NEC seeks, in the alternative, a declaration: (i) that
the microcode portion of the Intel 8086/8088 microprocessors (the
"Intel Microcode") is not, as claimed by Intel, subject to copyright
protection; (ii) that Intel has forfeited its alleged copyrights because
millions of copies of the Intel Microcode have been distributed to
the public, under Intel's authority, without copyright notice; and
(iii) that the microcode used by NEC in its V-Series microproces-
sors (the "NEC Microcode") does not infringe any valid and en-
forceable Intel copyright.1
After a year and a half of intensive discovery and numerous
motions, the case was tried in May, June and July, 1986 before
Judge William A. Ingram without a jury. On September 22, 1986,
Judge Ingram issued Partial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law2 which held that (i) the Intel Microcode constituted copyright-
able subject matter and (ii) the Intel copyrights had not been
forfeited.
Prior to the announcement of the Partial Findings, NEC had
informed the Court of the results of a just completed "clean room"
project.3 The new microcode developed in the clean room sup-
Copyright © 1987 NEC Electronics, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Robert C. Hinckley is general counsel of NEC Electronics Inc., Mountain View,
California. For their contributions, the author wishes to thank partners Robert B. Morrill,
Richard Franklin and Alan H. MacPherson, and associates Justin T. Beck, Brian Geoghegan,
Daniel R. Siegel, Douglas K. Derwin and Susan C. Palsa of the Santa Clara, California, law
firm of Skjerven, Morrill, MacPherson, Franklin & Friel, trial counsel for NEC in this litiga-
tion. The author also thanks the Computer Law Strategist for inspiring the title of this arti-
cle. See infra note 179.
I. NEC also contends that it is licensed by Intel to use the Intel Microcode in the V-
Series microprocessors, that Intel's alleged copyrights are unenforceable due to Intel's misuse
of those copyrights, and that Intel has unfairly competed with NEC. Those contentions are
not discussed in this article.
2. 645 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
3. See infra notes 180 to 187 and accompanying text. In a copyright infringement
case, because direct evidence of copying is rarely available, a prima facie case of copying is
typically proved circumstantially by showing (i) that the alleged infringer had access to the
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ported earlier NEC evidence that the similarities between the Intel
and NEC Microcodes urged by Intel as "evidence of copying',4
were in fact the result of constraints5 imposed on the designer of the
NEC Microcode.by similarities between the products' respective
microarchitectures6 (for which NEC was licensed) and by imple-
mentation of the same, concededly unprotected, macroinstruction
set.7 When Judge Ingram issued his Partial Findings with respect
to copyrightability and forfeiture, he also ordered the testimony re-
opened so that NEC might introduce additional evidence regarding
the results of that clean room development.
Shortly after the Partial Findings were received, NEC for the
first time became aware of facts which appear to have required
Judge Ingram's disqualification from the inception of the case.
Prior to and during the course of the trial, a small, private invest-
ment club of which Judge Ingram was a member and officer held
stock in Intel Corporation.8
When this was brought to Judge Ingram's attention by a letter
protected work and (ii) that there is substantial similarity of protected expression between the
allegedly infringing work and the copyrighted work. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Produc-
tions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). If it is shown that the
defendant had no access of any kind, there can be no infringement even if the two works are
identical. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-218 (1954); Selle v. Gibb, 567 F. Supp. 1173,
1182-83 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The "clean room" approach eliminates possible access by providing
to the persons involved in development of a competitive work only controlled information
which, while describing the idea of the work to be developed, has been carefully screened,
generally by counsel, to eliminate all expression of that idea which is the subject of the copy-
right that is to be avoided. Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. PITr. L.
REv. 1037, 1096-97 (1986).
4. See infra notes 121 to 146 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 147 to 164 and accompanying text.
6. Microarchitecture refers to the design of the microprocessor as "seen" by a
microcode designer. It includes storage for data ("registers") and pathways for moving data
("busses"), together with rules governing their use.
7. "Instruction set" or "macroinstruction set" means the collection of commands that
a computer can perform. "Microinstruction set" refers to the set of possible defined bit pat-
terns available to form a line of microcode.
8. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 (West Supp. 1986) provides in relevant part:
(a) Any ... judge ... shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances ....
(4) He knows that he... has a financial interest ... in a party to the proceed-
ing...
(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial
interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal
financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.
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from special counsel retained by NEC, Judge Ingram requested that
a formal recusal motion be made and stayed further proceedings.
The recusal motion was referred to another judge for resolution,
and as of the date of this article, that motion remains under submis-
sion. If Judge Ingram is ultimately found to have been disqualified,
one further issue will be the effect such disqualification has upon his
prior rulings, including the Partial Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
At stake in this litigation is whether Intel can use the copyright
law to cripple a competitor's efforts to enter the marketplace with
compatible products which are faster and better: the V-Series
microprocessors. In order to appreciate the NEC/Intel litigation it
is useful to understand the historical framework within which the
case has been fought.
Until recently, the two companies had enjoyed a cooperative
business relationship. In 1976, following extensive negotiations,
NEC and Intel entered into a broad Patent Cross-License Agree-
ment in which each company licensed the other under all existing
patents and patents for which applications would be filed during the
following 10 years, for the lives of those patents.9 The Patent-Cross
License Agreement did not provide for any exchange of technology
but committed the companies to hold periodic meetings, alternating
at the home of each, so that technical matters of mutual interest
(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases shall have
the meaning indicated:
(1) "proceeding" includes pretrial, appellate review, or other stages of
litigation;
(4) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, how-
ever small... except that...
(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is
not a "financial interest" in such securities unless the judge participates in the
management of the fund...
(e) No... judge.., shall accept from the parties to the proceeding a waiver of
any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the
ground for disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be ac-
cepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for
disqualification.
9. NEC Ex. 1.
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could be discussed as well as the possibility of technology
exchanges.
In early 1978, two years after executing the Patent Cross-Li-
cense Agreement, Intel announced the introduction into the market
of its 8086 microprocessor, hastily developed to compete with the
highly successful Zilog Z80 microprocessor. To help achieve mar-
ket acceptance, Intel encouraged NEC to become a second source
for the 8086.10 Reliable second sources were critically needed by
Intel at this time to give credibility to its product.1 "
In addition to developing and distributing its own original
products, NEC did become an 8086 second source. It did so
through a two-year reverse-engineering12 effort without assistance
from Intel, but with Intel's knowledge and blessing. In fact, NEC
sought and obtained Intel's prior approval of the NEC press release
announcing the NEC microprocessor, known as the [tPD8086.13
Intel used reliable second sources, including NEC, as a marketing
tool with potential customers. As a result, the 8086 achieved a tre-
mendous success and quickly became an industry standard
microprocessor.
In developing the [tPD8086, NEC believed that it was entirely
free to duplicate the Intel Microcode since Intel had encouraged
10. Transcript of Proceedings (hereinafter cited as "Tr.") Volume XIX 2688:12-
2690:16; Tr. XVIII 2599:2-2601:2.
11. Users of microprocessors, such as manufacturers of computers, automobiles and
other products, generally insist on having alternative sources of supply before they will com-
mit to incorporating a particular device into their products. This insistence is due to the dual
concerns that supply not be interrupted and that there be price competition. Therefore, for a
newly introduced microprocessor to achieve market success, second sources are essential.
The goal of a second source is to make a product which is fungible with the original
product. For such a product to be truly fungible, it must be compatible on all levels with the
original product. There are several levels of compatibility.
The lowest level of compatibility is referred to as "functional" or "instruction set" com-
patibility; that is, the products execute the same instructions. Functional compatibility im-
plies, but does not always guarantee, "software" compatibility; that is, while some software
programs intended to run on one device will operate correctly on the other, different pro-
grams, because of timing or other differences, may not. The next level is known as "pin"
compatibility; that is, one product may be plugged into a socket intended for the other prod-
uct and function as a replacement for the intended product, despite having different electrical
characteristics. The highest level is known as "test" or "electrical" compatibility; that is, the
two products are electrically identical. The goal of a second source is to be compatible on all
levels with the original product.
12. Reverse engineering is a standard technique in which a company studies a competi-
tor's product, and uses the knowledge gained to design a functionally similar competing prod-
uct. Reverse engineering was acknowledged as a legitimate industrial method, different from
copying, in the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 906(a) (West Supp.
1986).
13. NEC Ex. 31, 32.
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NEC to develop a second source product and because the Intel
Microcode was part of the microprocessor's hardware and thus, if
legally protectable at all, could only be protected by Intel's patents
under which NEC was licensed. Accordingly, the NEC piPD8086
microcode was virtually identical to the Intel Microcode.14 Signifi-
cantly, even though Intel had obtained an NEC [iPD8086 in
March, 1981, shortly after it was introduced, and had examined the
inside of the chip, at no time before August 1982 did Intel raise with
NEC any copyright issue concerning the microcode in the
piPD8086.
Of course, some of the advantages which cause customers to
insist on the existence of a second source for a microprocessor, such
as price competition, are disadvantages from the perspective of the
primary source, especially if the competitor is cost effective and
technologically equivalent. Accordingly, in August, 1982, after the
Intel 8086 was safely established as an industry standard and Intel's
need for NEC as a second source was no longer critical (but seven-
teen months after Intel had first examined a [xPD8086), Intel for the
first time notified NEC that its 1iPD8086 infringed Intel's alleged
copyright in the Intel Microcode.
NEC was shocked at the sudden turnaround in Intel's attitude
regarding the pPD8086, especially since Intel had previously ap-
proved and encouraged NEC's development of that product. But
NEC felt that, since its product was on the market and it had made
commitments to customers, it was best to settle with Intel. In Feb-
ruary, 1983, the two companies entered into a copyright license
agreement.
NEC was determined, however, that it would not be put in
such a position again. Even before the copyright license was exe-
cuted, NEC, motivated in part by Intel's copyright claim, canceled
its development plans for a low-power, CMOS15 version of the
iLPD8086 which would also have embodied the Intel Microcode.
Instead, an NEC team was instructed to develop a new and im-
proved family of proprietary CMOS microprocessors. These new
14. For the NEC 1 PD8086 to be a true second source product of the Intel 8086, i.e.,
compatible on all levels, it had to contain virtually the same microcode as the Intel 8086. In
contrast, the V20/V30 are both pin compatible and instruction set compatible, but not test
compatible with the 8086/8088. That is why the V20, for example, can be used to replace the
8088 in most personal computers, and will run most software written for the 8088, yet cannot
be called a "second source" of the 8088. See infra note 16.
15. "CMOS" refers to a type of semiconductor device known for its low power con-
sumption. The Intel 8086/8088 were NMOS devices which required significantly greater
power to operate.
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devices, called the V-Series, 16 were to be upwardly compatible with
the Intel 8086/8088; that is, they were to be capable of running the
Intel macroinstruction set, plus many powerful new macroinstruc-
tions which the Intel 8086/8088 could not run. The V-Series were
also to be faster and use significantly less power than Intel's 8086/
8088 microprocessors. NEC disclosed to Intel its plans for the V-
Series within weeks after the development effort began.
To achieve higher performance, the NEC team chose a dual
bus microprocessor design.17 While some of the basic V-Series
microarchitecture was quite similar to that of the 8086 (for which
NEC was licensed under the Patent Cross-License Agreement), the
new V-Series microprocessors were nonetheless physically different
from both the Intel 8086 and the NEC [xPD8086 in many respects
and, as a result, could not use the Intel Microcode. Physical differ-
ences such as the dual bus, hardware implementation of certain
arithmetic functions, and a different microcode format resulted in
NEC Microcode which, when laid beside the Intel Microcode, ex-
hibits no similarity.18 At trial, the only way Intel was able to even
suggest similarity between the Intel and NEC Microcodes was to
eliminate, by numerous "translations", the differences caused by the
different physical structures of the respective devices.' 9
When samples of NEC's final prototype V20 and V30 micro-
processors were completed and field testing was underway, NEC
presented the V-Series to several selected audiences, including Intel.
NEC hoped that Intel would become a second source for the V-
Series as NEC had done for the Intel 8086/8088. During this pe-
riod NEC furnished Intel with engineering samples of the new NEC
devices, which of course included the NEC Microcode, so that Intel
16. The mainstays in the NEC V-Series Family are the V20, V30, V40, V50, V60 and
V70 microprocessors. The family contains other microprocessors and complex peripheral
devices. The V20 and V30 are upwardly software and pin compatible, but not test compati-
ble, (see supra, note 11) with the 8088 and 8086 respectively. The V20 and V30 execute the
8086/8088 macroinstructions as well as those of the 80186 microprocessor, emulate the 8080
microprocessor (see infra, note 106) and have additional unique V-Series macroinstructions.
The V40 and V50 microprocessors are the V20 and V30 microprocessors with additional
peripheral functions contained on each chip. The V40 and V50, while upwardly software
compatible, cannot be used as a direct replacement for any Intel product. The V60 and V70
are 32-bit microprocessors which maintain the upward software compatibility with the V-
Series. The microcode in the V60 and V70 microprocessors was not involved in the suit.
17. The Intel 8086/8088 possesses a single bus, or path for transferring data, so only
one transfer can occur at a time. The V20/V30 has two paths, so that two transfers can occur
simultaneously.
18. See infra notes 101 to 106 and accompanying text.
19. NEC disputes the validity of Intel's "translations." See infra notes 106 to 110 and
accompanying text.
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not only could evaluate the desirability of becoming a second source
but also could satisfy itself that the NEC Microcode was non-
infringing.
A number of months passed during which NEC attempted to
obtain a commitment from Intel to become a second source for the
V-Series and/or an acknowledgment of NEC's independent devel-
opment of its new products.20 In response, NEC received only ex-
cuses and promises that Intel's analysis would soon be complete,
but no answers.21 Meanwhile, during this critical time in the mar-
keting of the new NEC device, NEC became aware that questions
concerning the legality of NEC's new products were being raised
among potential customers by unknown sources. Stories to the
same effect started to appear in newspapers and the trade press.
The negative impact of these rumors on NEC's potential customers
mandated the removal of this cloud as quickly as possible and NEC
accordingly filed this action for declaratory relief.
III. THE LEGAL ISSUES
A. Copyrightability of the Intel Microcode
It is undisputed that computer hardware is not copyrightable,
but only patentable.22 It is now also settled that computer software
is copyrightable.23 The computer industry has long recognized,
however, that microcode fits neatly into neither category; it is
neither quite hardware nor quite software, but occupies an interme-
diate position which computer engineers have come to refer to as
"firmware." 24 Therefore, the issue of first impression in this case is
20. As was subsequently shown by internal Intel documents, it was quickly apparent to
Intel that the NEC V-Series significantly outperformed the Intel products. NEC Ex. 208,
209. Intel was unprepared for such competition, and apparently would not have the capabil-
ity to make its own low power CMOS 8086/8088 until over a year after the introduction of
the V-Series. Tr. XVII 2486:3-2487:24. In the meantime, Intel was forced to purchase
CMOS parts from competitors and package them under the Intel name. Tr. VII 1112:8-
1113:6; 1116:19-1117:15; Intel Ex. JD.
21. Intel did finally, in late 1984, inform NEC that the results of its initial analysis of
the NEC Microcode were "inconclusive." Tr. VI 902:14-22.
22. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (1977); 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 6 2.18MF
(1986); Final Report, Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyright Works
("CONTU") at 20. See infra note 169.
23. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corporation, 714 F.2d 1240
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
24. Intel's expert, Dr. David A. Patterson, published an article in Scientific American
in which he classified microcode as "firmware, thereby signifying that intermediate status
between hardware and software." Patterson, Microprogramming, 248 Sc. AM. 50 (March
1983). NEC Ex. 449.
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whether the proper legal protection to be afforded firmware such as
the Intel Microcode is via the patent or copyright laws.
Reduced to its simplest terms, the question of whether the In.-
tel Microcode is copyrightable can be stated this way: was the crea-
tor of the Intel Microcode designing a computer or programming a
computer?"5 If the former, then patent, not copyright, is the appro-
priate means of protection. 6 The line between hardware and
software has to be drawn someplace. On which side of that line the
Intel Microcode falls must be determined according to the policies
underlying our intellectual property laws.
The syllogism put forward by proponents of the copyright-
ability of the Intel Microcode is that all computer programs are
copyrightable;27 the Intel Microcode is a computer program; there-
fore, the Intel Microcode is copyrightable.28 However, this simplis-
25. Unfortunately the term "microcode" has been and is used even by technical people
to refer to a variety of structures and approaches. For example, there are specially designed
computers which are programmable on the micro level. Programs written for those com-
puters, primarily laboratory or university learning tools, are also called microcode. The
programmer selectable sequences of microinstruction created to instruct those machines were
not involved in NEC v. Intel. The issue at hand was whether the Intel Microcode, developed
as an integral part of the computer design process, is more appropriately protected by copy-
right or patent. Throughout the remainder of this article, the term "microcode" refers only
to the Intel Microcode.
26. It has already been established that firmware may constitute a part of a patentable
invention. In re Bradley and Franklin, 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979), affd by an equally
divided court, 450 U.S. 381 (1981).
27. See, eg., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corporation, 714 F.2d 1240
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
28. Intel also argued that its Microcode was copyrightable on the ground that it was a
"literary work." 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (1977) sets forth the general requirements for
copyrightability as well as categories of copyrightable subject matter:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of
authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works:
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
It has been held that the category of § 102(a) into which computer programs fit is the
"literary works" category. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). Thus Intel argued that the
Intel Microcode was copyrightable as a literary work. Of course, once it is shown that the
Intel Microcode does not qualify as a "computer program" that ground for finding that it is a
"literary work" disappears. Intel offered no evidence at trial that its Microcode constituted
any other form of literary work, and never seriously advanced any such argument. In any
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tic approach assumes the very conclusion being sought and ignores
the many significant differences between the Intel Microcode and
computer programs.
Rather than simply asking whether the label "computer pro-
gram" can be made to fit the Intel Microcode, a proper resolution of
this crucial question requires an analysis of the function of the Intel
Microcode, its relation to the 8086/8088 microprocessors, and the
respective concerns and policies sought to be protected and ad-
vanced by the patent and copyright laws. Only through such an
analysis can one intelligently decide the proper form of protection
for the Intel Microcode.
Patents protect new and useful processes (including methods),
machines, manufactures and compositions of matter and new and
useful improvements thereof.29 In order to obtain a patent, an in-
ventor must disclose the invention to the United States Patent and
Trademark Office3" and meet certain criteria, for example, that the
invention be novel, useful and nonobvious31 After a rigorous ex-
amination,32 to ensure the invention meets the criteria established
by Congress, a patent is granted for a limited period of time, namely
17 years.33 After expiration of the 17-year period, the invention
falls into the public domain. However, during the life of the patent,
the inventor has the legal right to exclude others from making, us-
ing, or selling the invention. 4 A patent essentially grants to the
inventor a monopoly over the invention expressed in the claims of
the patent, without regard to whether a later user copied from the
patent or independently developed the same invention. Moreover,
under the "doctrine of equivalents", a patent is infringed by any
product or process which performs substantially the same function
in substantially the same way to obtain the same result, even though
the infringing product or process may not correspond to the literal
terms of the claims of the patent.3"
The copyright laws, on the other hand, protect the original
event, changing the proposed label from "computer program" to "literary work" does not
address any of the substantive considerations, discussed infra, which compel the conclusion
that the Intel Microcode is not copyrightable subject matter. See infra notes 29 to 69 and
accompanying text.
29. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1984).
30. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 111-122 (1984 and West Supp. 1986).
31. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-103 (1984 and West Supp. 1986).
32. 35 U.S.C.A. § 131 (1984).
33. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (1984).
34. Id.
35. See generally, 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 18.04 (1986).
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writings of authors, rather than inventions. 36 The copyright laws
do not protect any idea, but only the author's particular expression
of the idea.37 Moreover, even if a second author produces a work
whose expression is identical to the work of another, but is the re-
sult of the second author's independent efforts, there is no infringe-
ment. 38 To obtain a copyright, nothing need be done except to fix
the original work of authorship in a tangible medium of expres-
sion. 39 That is, merely by writing the creative expression on a piece
of paper, one has a copyright. In order to preserve the copyright,
the author must give notice to the world of the copyright by putting
a copyright notice on published copies of the work.40 To enforce a
copyright, the owner generally need only obtain a certificate of re-
gistration from the Copyright Office.4 None of the examination
procedures utilized for patents applies to copyrights and a copyright
lasts for at least three times the 17-year duration of a patent.42
Both patents and copyrights exist primarily for the public in-
terest, not the interests of inventors and authors. 43 A limited mo-
nopoly is granted primarily not as a reward, but to encourage new
works for the ultimate public benefit.' Given their common ori-
gin45 and purpose, the differences between the patent and copyright
laws are striking. Those differences reflect long standing policyjudgments about the nature of the works involved, the type of activ-
ities to be encouraged, and the cost of the monopoly being granted.
Broadly speaking, the goal of patent law is technological progress.
Therefore, only those inventions that advance the state of the art in
some useful and nonobvious way are protected. On the other hand,
36. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (1977).
37. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (1977).
38. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-218 (1954); Selle v. Gibb, 567 F. Supp. 1173,
1180 (N.D. Il. 1983).
39. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (1977).
40. 17 U.S.C.A. § 401 (1977).
41. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (1977). Hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, section numbers
refer to Title 17 United States Code.
42. See generally, 17 U.S.C.A. § 302 (1977). With certain exceptions, copyright en-
dures for a term consisting of the life of the author plus fifty years. "Works made for hire"(i.e., works created by employees) and certain other works have a duration of at least 75
years.
43. Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984).
44. Id.
45. Both the copyright and the patent laws find their origins in Article I, Section 8 of
the Federal Constitution, which grants Congress the power: To promote the Progress ofScience and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
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copyright law encourages a diversity of original, but not necessarily
better, writings.
Science and technology are centripetal, conducing toward a sin-
gle optimal result. One water pump can be better than another
water pump, and the rule of patent and trade secret law is to
direct investment toward such improvements. Literature and the
arts are centrifugal, aiming at a wide variety of audiences with
different tastes .... The aim of copyright is to direct investment
toward abundant rather than efficient expression.46
To relate the foregoing concepts to the Intel Microcode, some
understanding of computer technology is required. Computers in
general, including microprocessors, consist basically of five parts; an
arithmetic logic unit, registers, a control unit, input and output, and
main memory. A computer is a machine that is designed to per-
form certain specified operations, i.e., those operations specified in
its instruction set.47 In early computers, each operation was per-
formed entirely by hardware. In the early 1950s, however, English
designers concluded that computer design could be simplified
through the use of microcode as the control unit of the computer.
To employ microcode in a computer, the computer designer
defines a series of suboperations, and organizes the control unit of
the computer so that each macroinstruction is performed by activat-
ing the appropriate sequence of microoperations and appropriate
logic circuits. Thus, microcode can be seen as a sequence of instruc-
tions, but at a level indistinguishable from the hardware. The major
advantage of microcode is simplicity of design. A microcoded
microprocessor can be designed in less time than a microprocessor
without microcode. The price paid for such an advantage is some
loss of performance, i.e., speed of execution.
The Intel Microcode is a fixed part of the control portion of the
8086/8088 microcomputer, and indeed, in all meaningful respects is
inseparable from it. The 8086/8088 does not exist without that In-
tel Microcode portion any more than it would exist if its arithmetic-
logic unit (ALU) section were to be removed. Correspondingly, the
Intel Microcode has no practical use other than as a functioning
part of the entire 8086/8088 microprocessor. Because of this close
tie between microcode and hardware, the form of the microcode is
dictated more by the requirements of the computer than by the cre-
ativity of an author. Thus, while much of the same terminology
46. Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. Pmrr. L. Rxv.
1119, 1123 (1986).
47. See supra note 7.
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which describes computer programs is, unfortunately, also used to
describe microcode, the function that microcode performs is the
function performed by hardware and indeed the Intel Microcode
takes the form of hardware (i.e., transistors) in the Intel 8086/8088.
Accordingly, because microcode is effectively inseparable from
the microprocessor itself, the sensible approach in determining the
legal protection to be afforded microcode is to decide on the proper
form of protection for the microprocessor as a whole, including the
microcode. Microprocessors are already subject to patent 48 and
mask work49 protection. To now extend, in addition, copyright
protection to such a device, even if ostensibly limited to its
microcode portion, may well produce de facto copyright protection
for the entire microprocessor, a result clearly not envisioned by the
copyright laws.5" Therefore, copyright protection for microcode
cannot be discussed without considering the extent to which its
companion hardware will thereby also be "protected". If the pro-
fessed goal in seeking copyright protection for microcode is to en-
courage new and better microprocessors, then patent and mask
work law already provide appropriate and sufficient protection.
At trial, Intel never advanced any substantive policy reasons to
justify microcode copyrightability. Rather, Intel's strategy was to
mechanically show that its Microcode bore similarities to computer
software and argue that it therefore fit the statutory definition of 17
U.S.C. Section 101: A "computer program" is a set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result. Intel argued that its
Microcode is a computer program because, like a computer pro-
gram, it can be represented by zeros and ones, can be stored on a
computer tape, and can be expressed in high and low level symbolic
languages. However, these analogies miss the point. The entire
microprocessor, or indeed any hardware, can be represented in ze-
ros and ones, and that representation can be stored on a computer
tape, and can be expressed in high and low level symbolic lan-
guages. Every machine and process, no matter how complex, is
subject to such representation. 1 It is clear, however, that copyright
law protects only such representation, not the thing represented. 2
48. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1984).
49. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-914 (West Supp. 1986).
50. See supra note 22. By the end of the NEC v. Intel trial, this is precisely what Intel
had tried to do. See infra notes 171 to 179 and accompanying text.
51. Tr. XII 1861:7-1862:1.
52. Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1972) (copyrighted archi-
tectural plans cannot clothe author with exclusive right to reproduce the dwelling pictured);
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In response to Intel's semantic argument, NEC pointed out
that the Copyright Act's definition of a computer program does not,
as urged by Intel, require a finding that the Intel Microcode is a
computer program. On the contrary, that definition limits com-
puter programs to sets of statements of instructions "to be used...
in a computer." The definition itself plainly shows Congress' un-
derlying premise that, before there can be a computer program,
there must first be a computer in which the program can be used;
the computer and the computer program are two distinct and sepa-
rate entities. When so understood, the Intel Microcode does not
meet the definition of computer program because it is part of the
computer itself, rather than something used "in a computer."
Without the microcode, there is no computer.
The question of whether microcode is "used in a computer" or
is "part of the computer" is more than mere semantics. If
microcode is an integral part of a noncopyrightable computer and
has no use other than as a part of such computer, what function
would copyright protection serve? Unlike software, microcode is
highly hardware dependent. Microcode cannot be moved from one
machine to another. The Intel Microcode, for example, could never
be made to work on the NEC microprocessor, even though the
microarchitectures have similarities.53
At trial, Intel relied heavily on the Apple v. Franklin54 case,
which held that an operating system program was copyrightable.
However, the function of the Intel Microcode is quite different from
the role played in a computer by either an application program or
an operating system program.55 Even the latter, although necessary
to allow a less sophisticated user to operate the computer, is none-
theless not a part of a computer. A computer can exist without any
specific operating system and the same operating system can be
used in different computers.56 This is not the case with the Intel
Russell v. Trimfit, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd., 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978)
(even if plaintiff's concept of mitten toe socks or glove socks were original creation, copy-
rights and copyrighted drawings of socks did not protect against defendant's manufacture of
such socks).
53. Even the microcode in the V20/V30 had to be modified to work in the V40/V50,
although the microarchitectures were nearly identical. Compare NEC Ex. 179 and 179A.
54. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
55. "Application programs" perform a specific task for a computer user, such as word
processing, checkbook balancing, or playing a game. "Operating system programs" manage
the internal functions of the computer or facilitate use of application programs.
56. A computer and its operating system constitute two products. In re Data General
Corporation Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd in relevant part,
734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1334 (1985). It is clear on the other
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Microcode portion of the 8086/8088 microprocessors.
Ultimately, the question of copyrightability must focus on the
monopoly being sought, and the cost of such a monopoly. Congress
and the courts have viewed with suspicion efforts to extend copy-
right to protect industrial products. This is shown, for example, in
the Copyright Act's provisions relating to a useful article and its
design or shape. The term "useful article" is defined in 17 U.S.C.
Section 101 as ". . . an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to
convey information." Although sculptural works are copyright-
able58 and the shape of any article, including a useful one, may be
characterized as a sculptural work, Congress chose to regulate the
interplay between copyright protection and utilitarian devices by
limiting copyright protection for the design of useful articles.
Such [pictorial, graphic and sculptural] works shall include
works of artistic craftsman insofar as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a
useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pic-
torial, graphic or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic or sculptural
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. 59
This denial of copyright protection to industrial designs pre-
vents de facto monopolies over noncopyrightable utilitarian articles.
A design which cannot be identified separately from, and is incapa-
ble of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article
must be available for competitors to use, or they will be unable to
produce the underlying utilitarian article.60 The same consideration
obtains in the case of the Intel Microcode. The extension of copy-
right protection to that portion of the 8086/8088 microprocessor
may effectively prevent competitors from using even the hardware
of Intel's microprocessors, because the microcode and the hardware
are so intimately related and mutually dependent.6
hand, the Intel 8086 with its Microcode is a single product. Tr. XVI 2325:6-2326:3; 2329A:4-
10.
57. Indeed, Apple v. Franklin specifically distinguished microcode from computer pro-
grams and stated that microcode was not involved in its decision. 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 n. 7
(3d Cir. 1983).
58. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(5) (1977).
59. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1977).
60. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 800-801 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
61. Indeed, Intel's ultimate position at trial was that NEC should not have used hard-
ware similar to that which had been used by Intel. See infra notes 171 to 179 and accompa-
nying text.
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The cost to society of a copyright monopoly for industrial
products may be high. In some circumstances copyright may well
discourage the creation of new and better products. In many indus-
tries companies study competitors' products, learn from them, and
use that knowledge to develop better products.62 Under traditional
copyright law, suppressing a competing industrial product would be
impossible. Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act makes clear that
copyright protection extends only to an author's expression:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of au-
thorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work.63
Therefore, for example, one cannot prevent a competitor from mak-
ing and selling a similar machine by copyrighting the machine's op-
erating manual which describes how the machine works.'
Yet that is precisely Intel's purpose. There was nothing partic-
ularly unusual or unique about the Intel Microcode.65 What makes
the Intel Microcode important is that its design is inextricably tied
to the hardware of the 8086. How closely tied the two were became
apparent when Intel raised its "bootstrap license" argument, assert-
ing in effect that its alleged microcode copyright could also protect
the 8086 architecture.66 The copyright monopoly Intel seeks would
prevent the study of existing technology and thereby retard innova-
tion in the market place, which innovation should in fact be en-
couraged. It is important to distinguish between two situations: (a)
defendant studies the plaintiff's product to learn how it works, and
then, using that knowledge, designs his own similar but improved
product; (b) defendant studies the plaintiff's product, but to save
time and effort copies it with minimal changes. Whatever one feels
about the second case, it would be a serious error to create a system
for protecting legal rights that discourages the first.67 Yet the sys-
tem urged by Intel, in which the paramount issue is whether the
defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff's product certainly penal-
62. See supra note 12.
63. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (1977).
64. Universal Athletic Sales v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1975); Decorative Aides
Corp. v. Staple Sewing Aides, 497 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd without opin., 657
F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1980); E.H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enterprises, 16 F.R.D. 571 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
65. Tr. IV 557:3-12; 565:23-566:25.
66. See infra notes 171 to 179 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 12.
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izes severely any study of competing products.6"
If the Intel Microcode is found to be copyrightable, the ulti-
mate effect may be to defeat the strong public interest in free access
to technology and to stifle legitimate competition. Any competitor
wishing to offer a functionally compatible computer or micro-
processor could easily be charged with copyright infringement by
the original developer solely on the basis of similarity in function.
The copyright monopoly, with its presumption of validity,69 would
be a frightening weapon having a significant in terrorem effect
against any competitor developing a compatible computer, whether
copied or not.
To summarize, courts should not be misled by a simplistic
characterization of microcode as a computer program into conclud-
ing that microcode is copyrightable. To do so is to give labels and
semantics supremacy over substance. There is much to lose and
nothing to gain by extending copyright protection to structures that
are inseparable from hardware.
B. Forfeiture Due to Lack of Notice
A second major issue at trial was whether Intel had forfeited
its alleged copyrights through the failure of Intel's licensees to affix
copyright notice to copies of the Intel Microcode which they dis-
tributed. To maintain copyright protection in the United States,
every copyright owner is required to give public notice of the claim
of copyright in the form and manner prescribed by statute on copies
distributed to the public under its authority.70 17 U.S.C. Section
401(a) reads in pertinent part:
Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the
United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a
notice of copyright as provided by this section shall be placed on
all publicly distributed copies from which the work can be visu-
ally perceived, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.
Failure to affix the required copyright notice will result in loss of
copyright protection unless the omission is otherwise permitted, ex-
cused or timely corrected pursuant to some other section of the
68. The basic principle is stated in the CONTU Report as follows: programmers are
free to read copyrighted programs and use the ideas embodied in them in preparing their own
works. Final Report, National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (1978) at 51. See infra note 169.
69. 17 U.S.C.A. § 410(c) (1977).
70. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-403 (1977).
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Act.7 1
The statutory saving provisions that were the primary focus of
evidence and argument in NEC v. Intel were two provisions of 17
U.S.C. Section 405(a).72 As relates to the evidence in the case,
those subsections provide that copyright protection will not be lost,
notwithstanding the distribution of copies without proper notice af-
fixed, if either (i) the number so distributed was "relatively small";
or (ii) a reasonable effort is made by the copyright owner to have
proper notice added to copies distributed within the United States
after discovery of the omission.
NEC showed that there had been distribution of copies of the
"work" (i.e., 8086/8088 microprocessors containing the Intel
Microcode) under Intel's authority without notice. Intel admitted
and the evidence at trial showed that millions of microprocessors
containing the Intel Microcode had been distributed by at least four
Intel licensees, including NEC, to the public without any copyright
notice whatsoever. The licenses from Intel to those four licensees
contained no requirement that the licensees affix copyright notice to
the microprocessors containing the Intel Microcode which they
distributed.73
This showing by NEC established a prima facie case of Intel's
failure to comply with the statutory notice requirement. It was In-
tel's burden74 to prove a defense under Section 405(a)(1) or (2); that
the quantities distributed were relatively small, or that Intel had
made a reasonable effort to add notice to copies distributed in the
71. Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 489 (9th
Cir. 1985); Donald Frederick Evans and Associates, Inc. v. Continental Homes, Inc., 785
F.2d 897, 905-06, (1lth Cir. 1986); 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.03 (1986).
72. 17 U.S.C.A. § 405(a) (1977) reads as follows:
Effect of Omission on Copyright. The omission of the copyright notice
prescribed by sections 401 through 403 from copies or phonorecords publicly
distributed by authority of the copyright owner does not invalidate the copy-
right in a work if
(1) the notice has been omitted from no more than a relatively small number
of copies or phonorecords distributed to the public; or
(2) registration for the work has been made before or is made within five years
after the publication without notice, and a reasonable effort is made to add
notice to all copies or phonorecords that are distributed to the public in the
United States after the omission has been discovered; or
(3) the notice has been omitted in violation of an express requirement in writ-
ing that, as a condition of the copyright owner's authorization of the public
distribution of copies or phonorecords, they bear the prescribed notice.
73. Intel Exs. A, EV, EX; NEC Ex. 254. Accordingly, the safe harbor of § 405(a)(3)
was not available to Intel.
74. Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 489-490
(9th Cir. 1985); Canfield v. Ponchatoula Times, 759 F.2d 493, 499 (5th Cir. 1985).
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United States7" after discovery of the omission.
1. The Number Without Notice Was Not "Relatively
Small"
17 U.S.C. Section 405(a)(1) provides that distribution without
copyright notice does not invalidate one's copyright if "the notice
has been omitted from no more than a relatively small number of
copies . . . distributed to the public." NEC introduced evidence
showing that approximately 11,000,000 8086/8088 microprocessors
embodying the Intel Microcode were distributed without proper no-
tice by Intel licensees, which represented about half of the total
number of copies distributed. Intel disputed this number but admit-
ted that about 3,000,000 microprocessors (or 11 percent of the total
as calculated by Intel) had been distributed without notice under its
authority, and urged that 3,000,000 was a relatively small number.
Most of the disparity in the numbers resulted from the different
manner in which the parties classified microprocessors which had
been distributed bearing forms of copyright notice other than "©
Intel 1978." For example, it appeared that one of Intel's licensees,
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), distributed over five million de-
vices bearing the notice "© AMD 1982." An interesting dispute
therefore arose regarding whether these copies should be counted as
marked or unmarked.76
75. For the purpose of determining whether the notice requirement was violated, distri-
bution throughout the world is considered (17 U.S.C.A. § 401(a) (1977)), but to determine
whether there had been a reasonable effort to correct the omission after discovery, the test is
what was done for copies distributed in the United States.
76. Intel's certificates of copyright registration showed that the year of first publication
of the Intel Microcode was 1978. The proper form of copyright notice was therefore "© Intel
1978." Although § 406(a) provides that an error in the name of the copyright owner appear-
ing in the notice does not affect the validity of the copyright, 17 U.S.C.A. § 406(b) (1977)
requires that:
Where the year-date is more than one year later than the year in which publi-
cation first occurred, the work is considered to have been published without any
notice and is governed by the provisions of Section 405. [Emphasis added].
Therefore, NEC argued, the AMD devices, among others, should be classified as un-
marked for purposes of determining the percentage of unmarked devices, because 1982 (the
year-date used by AMD) was more than one year later than 1978, the year in which publica-
tion of the Intel work first occurred.
In response, Intel argued without any support in the record, that the form of notice
employed by AMD was in fact proper because it referred to AMD's "copyright" in the to-
pography or layout of the chip, which was first "published" in 1982. Intel argued further,
that because the AMD topography was a "derivative work of the Intel Microcode", the single
AMD notice with the later year-date was effective under § 401(b)(2) to protect both the to-
pography and the earlier-published Intel Microcode. 17 U.S.C.A. § 401(b)(2) (1977) provides
that:
[I]n the case of compilations or derivative works incorporating previously pub-
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Intel's Section 405(a)(1) defense to copyright forfeiture raised
several other interesting questions for which no definitive case law
answer could be found. For example, does the phrase "relatively
small number" as used in 17 U.S.C. Section 405(a)(1) mandate con-
sideration solely of the percentage of devices distributed without no-
tice, as urged by Intel, or should consideration also be given to the
absolute number distributed?77 At what point in time should the
lished material, the year date of first publication of the compilation or deriva-
tive work is sufficient.
In reply, NEC first pointed out that there was no evidence in the record to support
Intel's derivative work theory. Furthermore, NEC argued that apart from Intel's failure of
proof, Intel's theory was patently wrong because (i) topography is in no meaningful sense
"derived" from microcode, and (ii) even prior to the passage in 1984 of the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-914 (West Supp. 1986), which provided an exclu-
sive and sui generis form of protection to a chip's layout for a ten-year period, topography
had never been held to constitute copyrightable subject matter and all attempts to register
such "works" had been uniformly rejected by the Copyright Office.
Judge Ingram ultimately held, without explanation, that "[c]ontentions of mismarking
... and purported issues relating thereto are not supported in the evidence." 645 F. Supp.
590 (N.D. Cal. 1986), Partial Finding of Fact No. 53. This finding suggests a view by Judge
Ingram that NEC's actual burden was not only to show that the notice on the AMD chips
deviated more than one year from the date of first publication of the Intel Microcode, but also
to anticipate and affirmatively disprove any possible theory which would validate the AMD
notice under the copyright law.
Subsequent to the announcement of the Partial Findings, the Ninth Circuit adopted
NEC's position that the burden of demonstrating that the AMD notice was valid had been on
Intel. Lifshitz v. Walter Drake & Sons, Inc., 806 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1986). In effect,
however, the entire issue of the mismarked chips became moot because Judge Ingram also
held that even the number of copies admitted by Intel to have been distributed without notice
was not "relatively small," and thus § 405(a)(1) failed to provide a defense to copyright
forfeiture.
77. In the cases to date, the largest absolute number which has been held to have been
"relatively small" was approximately 400, which amounted to 1% of the total number dis-
tributed. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 827 (11th
Cir. 1982). In a subsequent case, the Eleventh Circuit commented on its opinion in Original
Appalachian Artworks as follows:
We disagree, however, with the assertion that the holding in Original Appa-
lachian Artworks to the effect that 1 percent (400) of the total number of cop-
ies meet the "relatively few" test, necessarily contradicts a conclusion that
1,000 copies amounting to 1 percent of the total number in another situation
would not meet the test. The question must be answered on a case-by-case
basis in light of the totality of the circumstances. We find that on the facts of
this case, the 2,500 copies of the Hollybrooke in the promotional brochure and
advertising folders, which totaled approximately 2.4 percent of the total
number of copies, constitutes more than a relatively small number. Unlike the
situation in Original Appalachian Artworks where the 1 percent had defective
notices, the copies we are considering in the instant case had absolutely no
indication of copyright affixed. Furthermore, 2,500 copies is a significant
number in the absolute sense. Hence we find that the savings provision of
405(a)(1) does not apply to the Hollybrooke either. [Emphasis added.]
Donald Frederick Evans and Associates, Inc. v. Continental Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897, 910
(11 th Cir. 1986). See also, Florists' Transworld Delivery Association v. Reliable Glassware
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comparison be made between copies with notice and copies without
notice? If the number distributed without notice is, at any point in
time, more than relatively small, is the excuse under Section
405(a)(1) forever lost, or may a number which at Time X is rela-
tively large (for instance 50%), later become at Time Y relatively
small, (for instance 1%) by flooding the market with properly
marked copies? Should copies distributed by licensees who were
under an obligation to affix notice but whose products in fact con-
tained no notice be counted as bearing proper notice, no notice, or
were they to be totally excluded from consideration?
It is unclear from the Partial Findings whether Judge Ingram
considered these questions and if so, how they were decided. Intel
admitted that more than three million devices (constituting approx-
imately 11% by calculations most favorable to Intel) were distrib-
uted without notice. The Court found this undisputed number to be
more than relatively small and Intel's Section 405(a)(1) defense was
rejected.
2. Efforts to Add Notice After Discovery Were Not
Reasonable
Alternatively, Section 405(a)(2) provides that publication with-
out notice will not invalidate the copyright if:
registration for the work has been made before or is made within
five years after the publication without notice, and a reasonable
effort is made to add notice to all copies or phonorecords that are
distributed to the public in the United States after the omission
has been discovered.
Intel urged that, after discovering the omission of notice, it had
taken reasonable steps to have notice added to copies thereafter dis-
tributed in the United States and therefore that the omission of
copyright notice from the prior distributions should be excused
under Section 405(a)(2). The timeliness of Intel's copyright regis-
tration was not an issue. However, in order to determine the rea-
sonableness of Intel's efforts it was first necessary to determine
when discovery took place so that Intel's efforts could be evaluated
from that date.7"
and Pottery Co., Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 808 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (§ 405(a)(1) inapplicable
"[b]ecause almost one million vases were sold to member florists without the affixed notice,"
without any discussion by the court of percentages.)
78. The test set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2) of "reasonable effort" has been, without
exception, held to require not only reasonable acts but also reasonable acts within a reason-
able time. Gemveto Jewelry Company Inc. v. Jeff Cooper, Incorporated, 568 F. Supp. 319
(S.D. N.Y. 1983) (nothing done for "a minimum [ot] several months," and possibly longer,
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a. Discovery
The evidence presented by Intel with respect to discovery79
was primarily the testimony of Intel Vice President David House.
Mr. House testified that discovery occurred some time in the Spring
of 1985, as then reported to him by the Intel Legal Department. 0
He said he was assured that efforts were being made to have notice
added and that he believed that letters were written to licensees and
stickers containing proper notice were sent out to distributors at
about that time.81
Evidence introduced by NEC showed that Intel's in-house
General Counsel had asserted in writing that Intel knew of NEC's
nonmarking as early as August 1984.82 Further, Intel engineers
routinely examined microprocessor products of competitors, includ-
ing the nonmarking licensees, and such examination had to have
shown as early as 1981 that those products bore no copyright notice
either on the package or on the die.83 NEC also introduced testi-
mony that reports written by those Intel engineers regarding their
found not reasonable); Donald Frederick Evans and Associates, Inc. v. Continental Homes,
Inc., 785 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1986) (nothing done for ten months not reasonable):
The record reveals that the president of the Evans Group knew in May, 1982,
that Olin-American was distributing brochures containing Evans' designs with-
out a copyright notice. He testified that he informed the president of Olin-
American of the omission at that time, but took no further action because noti-
fying the client was all one could do at that point. It was not until March
1983, that Evans obtained a rubber stamp of its copyright notice and sent it to
Olin-American. 785 F.2d at 911.
79. The term "discovered" is not defined in the Copyright Act or in the cases that have
construed 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2). "Discovery", however, is generally held to include notice or
information of circumstances which would put a reasonable person on notice. In Donald
Frederick Evans and Associates, Inc. v. Continental Homes, Inc. the court noted:
.. at the time Evans sent CI its November, 1980 letter concerning its referral
of customers to the model homes built by Godfrey and H. Miller & Sons, it had
notice of [other] potential copyright problems and knew or should have known,
of the omission of notice on the copies being distributed in the flyers and sales
brochures since it stated in the letter that no copyright issue was involved in
the dispute. [Emphasis added.] 785 F.2d 897, 911 (11th Cir. 1986).
"Discovery" is generally held to include inquiry notice. For example, "discovery" of fraud
for purposes of the California Statute of Limitations (West's Ann. Cal. C.C.P. § 338(4) (West
Supp. 1987)) occurs when a party has notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonable person on
inquiry. Townsend v. Columbia Operations, 667 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1982); Turner v.
Lundquist, 377 F.2d 44, 47-48 (9th Cir. 1967); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Blade, 123 F. Supp.
131, 139-140 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
80. Tr. V 694:7-22; 695:11-25.
81. Tr. V 706:9-20; 719:4-12; 748:14-749:8.
82. NEC Ex. 367.
83. Tr. 2303:7-16; NEC Ex. 33. The die is the actual integrated circuit, a small piece of
silicon on which the microprocessor is etched. The package is a sealed container in which the
die is mounted.
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examinations of competitive products were distributed to Intel's se-
nior management.14 In addition, there was testimony that Intel
knew or should have known at the time that at least one of the
8086/8088 licenses were executed, that the particular licensee was
not then affixing notice of Intel's copyrightY
There is no case law that considers the relationship between
Section 405(a)(3) and Section 405(a)(2) of the Copyright Act.16
NEC argued that because Intel had failed to expressly require licen-
sees to mark, it had some duty to monitor those licensees to see
whether they were marking the 8086 products manufactured under
license from Intel. No mention of this argument is made in Judge
Ingram's Partial Findings.
In addition, Judge Ingram apparently did not consider that
what Intel's engineers must have known was thereby known to Intel
itself, for Judge Ingram agreed with Mr. House that Intel did not
discover the lack of notice until the spring of 1985 when its Legal
Department commissioned an engineer to purchase NEC and other
devices to examine them for notice.87
b. Efforts
The second issue faced by the Court in determining whether
the omission of copyright notice was to be excused under Section
405(a)(2) 85 was whether Intel's actions upon discovery of the ab-
sence of notice constituted the "reasonable effort" contemplated by
that subsection. Although the courts have tended to find a reason-
able effort wherever possible, even those courts which have been
most protective of copyright owners have required that at least
some action be taken after discovery to prevent future distribution
without notice in the United States. 9
The "effort" taken by Intel to have notice added to copies sub-
sequently distributed in the United States consisted essentially of
two steps. First, in the spring of 1985, long after Intel's employees
had examined the licensees' products and after NEC had already
asserted forfeiture of the Intel copyrights due to omission of notice,
Intel wrote letters to the licensees which had not been marking. In-
tel's second step was to send small red stickers saying "© Intel
84. NEC Ex. 33.
85. Tr. IV 603:24-605:12.
86. See supra note 72.
87. 645 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal. 1986), Partial Findings of Fact Nos. 37, 38.
88. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 405(a) (1977) which is reproduced in note 72, supra.
89. See, e.g., Shapiro & Son Bedspreads Corp. v. Royal Mills Assoc. 764 F.2d 69 (2d
Cir. 1985); Canfield v. Ponchatoula Times, 759 F.2d 493, 499 (5th Cir. 1985).
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1978" to NEC's distributors demanding that the stickers be placed
on all unmarked devices without offering to recompense the distrib-
utors for the expense involved or for the risk of damage to those
devices during such stickering.
The letters sent by Intel to its licensees were deliberately mis-
leading. Although Intel knew that certain licensees were not mark-
ing and had no obligation to mark under the terms of their
respective licenses, Intel nonetheless asked them to "confirm" that
they were complying with "their obligation" to mark.90 The letters
did not ask the licensees to start marking, nor offer to reimburse
them for the cost of marking which the licensees were under no
obligation to do.
The misleading nature of the letters prompted concern and
consternation on the part of the licensees and actually delayed initi-
ation of marking. The licensees, quite naturally, pointed out that
there was no marking obligation in their license agreements. After
several months of communications, two of the licensees eventually
agreed to add notice to new product beginning some time in the
middle of July. Products already in distribution in the United
States but which had not yet reached the public would only be
marked as and when convenient. At no time did Intel ever offer to
reimburse any licensee for expenses incurred.
The only other action taken by Intel and urged by it as being
reasonable for purposes of 17 U.S.C. Section 405(a)(2) was the mail-
ing of hundreds of thousands of small red stickers saying "© Intel
1978" to NEC's distributors91 together with the request that the
distributors place a sticker on each microprocessor. One major dis-
tributor testified that it simply ignored the request since the cost
would be considerable and there would be a substantial risk of dam-
aging individual devices in the process of putting stickers on them.92
When that distributor called the Intel Legal Department to com-
90. The letters also stated that "[o]n a regular basis, we ask our licensees to certify that
the appropriate markings are in fact being made." The head of Intel's Business Development
Department testified, however, that there was no on-going audit program; these were the first
such letters. Tr. XVII 2570:23-2571:9. This illustrates further that Intel was only interested
in creating a paper trail for purposes of the present lawsuit.
91. Intel did not send any stickers to other licensees to affix to unmarked products until
October, 1985, at the earliest. Intel never sent stickers to distributors of those licensees; those
distributors continued selling unmarked product for many months, until their inventories
were exhausted. Tr. VI 910:25-912:19.
92. Tr. XIX 2642:19-2645:19. The human handling of semiconductor devices can eas-
ily render them unusable due to bent or broken leads or the transmission of static electricity
to the device. Therefore, the distributor testified, employees are discouraged from handling
parts.
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plain about the effort being requested by Intel, the advice from In-
tel's in-house counsel was to just "forget it."9 3
In all, Intel's actions were designed to create an inexpensive
paper trail while shifting the cost of marking to licensees or distrib-
utors who were under no obligation to mark. That Intel's efforts
were ineffective is shown by the fact that there was a delay of sev-
eral months following the letters before Intel's licensees started to
mark new product, and apparently not one sticker was ever placed
on an existing product by a distributor or licensee. 94 It is also a
matter of record that Intel never checked to see whether any of the
stickers which had been sent out had in fact been used.95 Intel
knew that the stickers would not be used; the effort was a sham.
The attitude of Intel toward the stickers was confirmed by the testi-
mony of one of Intel's in-house attorneys that when he heard of the
stickers, he congratulated Intel's General Counsel for a great tacti-
cal stratagem. 96
Effective means of securing marking were open to Intel. The
minimal reasonable efforts required of Intel were: (i) to have offered
to bear the expense of immediate remarking of all microprocessors
under control of its licensees (Intel did not do this); (ii) to have
offered to bear the expense of replacing unmarked microprocessors
still in the inventories of the licensees' distributors with units which
were properly marked (Intel did not do this); and (iii) to have of-
fered to bear the expense of its licensees redoing their masks (used
in the manufacturing process) so that future microprocessor pro-
duction would have the proper copyright notice on the semiconduc-
tor itself (Intel did not do this). These minimal reasonable efforts
were required even though some extra effort and expense might
have been incurred.97
Intel's failure to comply with the provisions of 17 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 401 was not the error of an innocent and unsophisticated copy-
93. Tr. XIX 2646:3-18.
94. Tr. V 753:18-20; VI 909:19-25.
95. Tr. VI 909:19-25.
96. Tr. XVIII 2578:10-2582:9. Of course, in other situations, sending out stickers or
tags to be added by distributors has been held to be part of a reasonable effort. See, e.g.,
Shapiro and Sons Bedspreads v. Royal Mills Assoc., 764 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1985); Florists'
Transworld Delivery Ass'n v. Reliable Glassware and Pottery, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 808
(N.D. Il. 1981). However, in those cases the products involved were relatively few and not
susceptible to damage by being handled.
97. "Implicit in the concept of a 'reasonable effort' under § 405(a)(2) is the expectation
that an expenditure of time and money over and above that required in the normal course of
business will be made." Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Electronics, 586 F. Supp. 478, 483 (D.
Nev. 1984).
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right owner. Intel is knowledgeable with respect to patents and
copyrights and aggressively uses intellectual property laws in sup-
port of its marketing efforts. During the time Intel was ignoring its
obligations under 17 U.S.C. Section 401, Intel was fully aware of
this requirement and contemporaneous internal Intel memoranda
comment on the significance and consequences of failure to use
proper copyright notice.9" Notwithstanding this, Intel failed to take
the simple precautionary steps of inserting written obligations to
mark in its license agreements, which would have given Intel an
absolute safe harbor under 17 U.S.C. Section 405(a)(3). Yet, Intel
has so far been able to avoid the consequences of its conduct with
an ineffective series of letters and stickers designed to pass on to
others the cost of the reasonable effort to add notice.
C. Noninfringement
The third major issue at trial was whether, if Intel had valid
copyrights on its Microcode, the NEC Microcode infringed those
copyrights.
1. The NEC and Intel Microcodes
Microcode, as used in the microprocessors at issue, can be de-
scribed as the control structure for implementing a given set of
macroinstructions on a given hardware.99 Microcode can be repre-
sented in several different forms. At the machine level, it is ex-
pressed by the presence or absence of transistors formed as part of
the microprocessor; in object code form it can be represented by
zeros and ones; it can also be represented in source code by a set of
microinstructions. When two computing machines execute the
same macroinstruction set on the same or similar hardware, there
will be certain similarities in the functioning of the two microcodes.
It is these functional similarities between the NEC and Intel
Microcodes that exist as a result of the constraints imposed by the
macroinstructions and hardware that Intel focused on during the
trial.100
At the outset, it should be noted that physically the Intel and
NEC Microcodes are quite different in almost every meaningful
way. The Intel Microcode is 512 lines long and each line is 21
bits'0 1 wide. The NEC Microcode is 1024 lines long, and each line
98. NEC Ex. 246, p. 164.
99. See supra text accompanying note 47.
100. See infra notes 121 to 164 and accompanying text.
101. A "bit", commonly represented by a zero or a one, is the smallest unit by which
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is 29 bits wide. The difference in line width results from several
basic differences in format between the two Microcodes. 10 2 These
format differences arise both from NEC's unique dual bus architec-
ture1°3 and from the existence of unique fields"° in the NEC
Microcode. In addition, the Intel Microcode has six different types
of microinstructions available whereas the NEC Microcode has
only three types available.10 5 The object codes (the pattern of zeros
and ones) and the source codes (the microinstructions in human
readable form) which describe the physical Microcodes are also to-
tally different.
Not all of the 1024 lines in the NEC Microcode are used for
the 8086 instruction set. Of the total 1024 lines, 472 were devoted
to other purposes: 168 to run original NEC instructions which are
not found in any Intel products; 116 for the Intel 80188/80186 in-
structions which can be run on the V-Series; and 188 for emulation
of the 8080 microprocessor.10 6 Intel made no claim that any of
these parts of the NEC Microcode infringed any Intel copyright.
The remaining 552 lines of the NEC Microcode are devoted to car-
rying out the 8086 instruction set and are the focus of Intel's
allegations.
Given the near total dissimilarity between the Intel and NEC
Microcodes, Intel resorted to a "translation" of the two Microcodes
to a hybrid "common language" in order to show "similarities" at
trial. While a translation may be useful to facilitate a comparison,
Intel's translation, done in a language not used by either of the orig-
inal Microcodes, eliminated or actually hid many of the real differ-
ences between the two Microcodes which result from hardware or
other differences.
For example, where the Intel Microcode required two opera-
tions to move information from two memory locations to an adder,
information can be transmitted. Microcode functions by opening or closing switches, repre-
sented by bits, which in turn control the state of all the circuitry connected to the switch.
102. In fact, the two Microcodes were so different in format that Intel's engineers were
never able to dissemble the NEC Microcode, that is, convert it from the form found in a chip
to a human intelligible form. To understand the NEC Microcode, Intel first had to obtain
from NEC detailed internal design information.
103. See supra note 17.
104. A line of microcode is divided into "fields," that is subparts of one or more bits,
which control a particular part of the processor circuitry, with each bit pattern defining a
unique processor state.
105. See Appendix which is NEC Ex. 428A that shows the different formats and types.
106. The Intel 8080 microprocessor has no microcode. A portion of the NEC
Microcode enables a V-seres microprocessor to act as if it were an 8080, i.e., to emulate the
8080.
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NEC could move such information in parallel because of its unique
dual bus structure. Through its translation, Intel eliminated differ-
ences arising from the NEC structure. Of course, by imaginative
creation and application of translation rules such as those proposed
by Intel it is possible to eliminate any difference whatsoever given
sufficient ingenuity on the part of the person doing the translation.
By means of such translation rules Intel was able to create similari-
ties where none had existed previously.
Intel's translation was questionable in other respects as well.
For example, Intel did not include in its translation those Intel se-
quences that did not have a corresponding NEC routine. Most no-
table was the "magic instruction", an undocumented instruction
hidden by Intel in the Intel Microcode to detect copying. 107 When
Intel analyzed the NEC Microcode it found, to its disappointment,
that it did not contain the magic instruction.108 Because the NEC
Microcode did not contain the magic instruction, Intel did not
translate it. Similarly, Intel used microcode to perform effective ad-
dress generation, while NEC elected instead to use hardware to per-
form that operation. Intel did not include the effective address
sequence in its translation of the Intel Microcode.
The creation of similarities between the Microcodes through
Intel's translation was compounded by the approach taken at trial
by Intel's expert witness, Dr. David Patterson. In his comparison
of the Microcodes, Dr. Patterson ignored differences between the
Microcodes if the differences were required by differences in hard-
ware or by differences in the NEC and Intel microinstruction sets,
that is, where both the 8086 and V-Series microcode designers were
not able to make the same choice.10 9 Accordingly, Intel took the
contradictory position of complaining that NEC had used similar
hardware to facilitate copying,110 but where there were differences
in NEC's hardware or microinstruction set, Intel ignored the result-
ing differences in the NEC Microcode.
Obviously, NEC disputes the validity of Intel's translation
rules, as well as Dr. Patterson's methodology and analysis. The re-
107. Tr. XVI 2297:18-2299:13.
108. Tr. 2483:25-2485:16.
109. Tr. XX 2836:10-17; II 204:25-205:19. There were many differences between the
two Microcodes which were required by the differences between the microarchitectures. For
example, by Intel's own count there were 36 "unique" Intel and 28 "unique" NEC
microoperations, that is, microoperations that could be performed on one machine but not
the other. Intel Ex. ABD. Essentially Dr. Patterson ignored all 64 of these unique
microoperations in his analysis.
110. See infra notes 171 to 179 and accompanying text.
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mainder of this article, however, shows that even after the two
Microcodes were translated by Intel, they still were not substan-
tially similar in protected expression.
2. The Law of Copyright Infringement
Copyright infringement consists of two elements: (a) proof that
the defendant copied from the plaintiff's copyrighted work and (b)
proof that the copying "went so far as to constitute improper appro-
priation." '11 It is not enough to prove merely the first element, i.e.,
that the defendant copied, because some types of copying are per-
missible.' 12 The second element of every copyright infringement
case, showing what and how much was copied, is often referred to
as the substantial similarity test whereby the plaintiff must show
that the expression utilized by the defendant is substantially similar
to the protected expression in plaintiff's work."' As described in-
fra, Intel tried to structure its case to avoid the second part of the
Arnstein test. Intel's approach was to point to isolated similarities
between the two Microcodes in an attempt to convince the Court
that NEC had copied something from Intel, 4 and then try to
equate such copying with infringement. As a consequence, it was,
conveniently to Intel, never made clear exactly what protected ex-
pression Intel claimed NEC had copied.
3. Intel's Isolated Similarities Case
Regardless of how a plaintiff attempts to prove the first element
of the Arnstein test, every plaintiff must also prove "substantial sim-
ilarity of protected expression" between the accused work and the
111. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corporation, 562 F.2d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1977).
112. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472-473 (2d Cir. 1946); Hoehling v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980); Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game
Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984). Types of permissible copying include copying of
noncopyrightable elements of a work such as ideas, merged expression and scenes a faire. See
infra notes 165 to 170 and accompanying text. Some courts have carelessly and erroneously
assumed that when copying has been proven, there is no need to consider what and how
much has been copied. See infra note 122. For an example of a case where a court found
"permissible copying", see Universal Athletic Sales, Inc. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir.
1975).
113. See, eg., Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977): "If there is substantial similarity in ideas, then the trier of fact must decide
whether there is substantial similarity in the expressions of the ideas so as to constitute
infringement."
114. NEC showed that those similarities were not in fact evidence of copying. Rather,
they were similarities which had to exist given the constraints on the NEC microcode de-
signer. See infra notes 147 to 164 and accompanying text.
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copyrighted work."' In NEC v. Intel, this required Intel to show
the Court how the two Microcodes, which physically appear very
different, are in fact substantially similar in protected expression.
Certainly, Intel's translation guaranteed the Microcodes would
appear somewhat similar, 116 but that is not sufficient. A showing of
substantial similarity requires more than inherent or trivial similari-
ties." 7 It requires that the small part of the Intel Microcode, if any,
that constitutes protected expression be distilled and be shown to be
substantially similar to the NEC Microcode. 118
Distinguishing the protected expression, if any, contained
within the Intel Microcode from the unprotectible "idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov-
ery,' 19 and determining what part of the expression contained
within the Intel Microcode is unprotectible due to the merger doc-
trine,120 requires a sufficient technical understanding of microcode.
Rather than educating the Court as to the nature of microcode,
Intel's approach was essentially to ignore the required showing of
115. "Just as copying is an essential element of infringement, so substantial similarity
between the plaintiff's and the defendant's works is an essential element of copying." 3 M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A (1986).
116. See supra notes 106 to 110 and accompanying text.
117. See, eg., Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981):
[It is not enough to observe that there are a great number of similarities in
expression between the two games. It is necessary to determine whether the
similar forms of expression are forms of [expression that] simply cannot be
avoided in any version of the basic idea of a video game involving space rocks.
Id. at 229.
The Atari court went on to find a lack of substantial similarity of protected expression,
noting that "most of these similarities are inevitable, given the requirements of the idea of a
game involving a spaceship combating space rocks and given the technical demands of the
medium of a video game." Id.
118. Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 491 (9th
Cir. 1985); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 1753 (1985); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977).
119. The copyright law prohibits only the substantial appropriation of the protected ex-
pression of another's work, but does not protect any ideas contained within that work. 17
U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (1977) provides:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, princi-
ple or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated or embodied in such work.
120. The "merger doctrine", discussed more fully infra at notes 165 through 170 and
accompanying text, states essentially that where there are only one or a few dissimilar ways of
expressing a particular idea, all such manners of expression "merge" with the underlying
idea. Merged expressions are not protected by copyright. This doctrine prevents any author
from gaining a de facto monopoly on the underlying idea in contravention of § 102(b). See
supra note 119.
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substantial similarity of protected expression. Instead, Intel's strat-
egy was to focus on discrete, isolated similarities which were largely
the inherent result of the hardware similarities or of the simplicity
of the sequence in question.1 21 Such evidence requires little techni-
cal understanding by the trier of fact, is relatively easy to present,
and given the difficult technical subject matter, can rather easily be
made to take on an exaggerated and unwarranted degree of signifi-
cance. Where the trier of fact is unable to meaningfully understand
two works, such a showing of similarities, whatever their signifi-
cance, may be gratefully seized upon to support a finding of
infringement. 122
121. Because the focus of Intel's case was on whether NEC used the Intel Microcode,
rather than whether the works were substantially similar, Intel also introduced evidence con-
cerning the development history of the V20/V30, and the background of the NEC engineer
who was responsible for the NEC Microcode, Hiroaki Kaneko. Intel portrayed Mr. Kaneko
as young and inexperienced and argued that because he was under "tremendous time pres-
sures", he was forced to take shortcuts in order to meet his deadlines. NEC, on the other
hand, showed that Mr. Kaneko was an exceptionally talented engineer and computer scien-
tist, that the schedule for the project was not unusual, and that the NEC Microcode was
completed in a normal time frame.
Although the parties calculated development times differently, Intel did not controvert
NEC's expert testimony that an engineer of Mr. Kaneko's ability could have developed the
NEC Microcode in the time actually taken. Tr. IX 1429:13-1431:19. The Intel Microcode
was completed and 95% debugged in less than two months. Mr. Kaneko's first draft was
done in six weeks but 95% of the debugging took several more months. The "clean room"
microcode, discussed infra, was completed and 95% debugged in two weeks. See infra notes
181 to 188 and accompanying text.
Intel demonstrated an impressive ability to find "copying" even in the most trivial
events. Mr. Kaneko conceded at trial that it was possible he had looked at his listing of the
NEC [LPD8088 microcode while working on the NEC Microcode, even though he did not
recall doing so. That concession was seized on by Intel's counsel as a damning admission.
Tr. XXI 2964:5-8. Apparently, in Intel's eyes, looking at the Intel Microcode is the same as
copying it. Intel ignored the basic principle that there is no impropriety whatsoever in read-
ing a copyrighted work. On the contrary, the very purpose of our copyright law is to en-
courage authors to publish their works so that society may utilize and benefit from their
teachings.
"[P]rogrammers are free to read copyrighted programs and use the ideas embodied in
them in preparing their own works." Final Report, National Commission on New Techno-
logical Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU") (1978) at 51. See infra note 169.
122. Intel's strategy was similar to that of other recent computer copyright plaintiffs
presenting infringement claims. In practice, the computer plaintiff's strategy has been to
focus on whether the defendant "copied," and pay little more than lip service to the issue of
substantial similarity between the works as a whole, hoping to obfuscate this required element
by convincing the Court that any "copying" constitutes infringement. M. Kramer Manufac-
turing Company, Inc. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986), provides a good example of
what happens when a court confuses "copying" and "substantial similarity." In Kramer, the
plaintiff alleged infringement of an audiovisual copyright in a video poker game screen dis-
play. The trial court, in a bench trial, compared the two works and found they were not
substantially similar in appearance. Nevertheless, on appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the
defendant's display infringed the plaintiff's work, because the defendant had "copied" a sub-
stantial part of a computer program that generated the display.
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Presumably Intel hoped that the Court would overlook the fact
that such similarities constituted neither similarities of protected ex-
pression nor a substantial portion of the Intel Microcode. Under
different circumstances not present in this case, isolated similarities
may constitute evidence of copying, the first element of the Arnstein
test. 123 However, the quantum and nature of substantial similarity
of protected expression necessary for a finding of infringement is
different. 124 More important in the context of NEC v. Intel, similar-
ities in unprotected elements, such as merged expression 25 or
scenes a faire, 126 must be factored out of the substantial similarity
analysis for the purpose of determining infringement.
127
Thus the district court addressed only whether the defendant's game was sub-
stantially similar to [plaintiff's] game .... The district court, however, lost
sight of the ultimate issue: whether Drews Distributing copied the plaintiff's
game. If there was clear proof of actual copying by the defendants, that is the
end of the case. 783 F.2d at 445.
The occasional case such as Kramer ignores the fact that substantial similarity of pro-
tected expression is, in itself, a necessary element of plaintiff's case; it does not make any
difference whether the defendant "copied", if the resulting work is not substantially similar in
protected expression to the plaintiff's work. See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1983)
(upholding summary judgment in favor of defendant because no substantial similarity of ex-
pression between the works); See Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc.,
777 F.2d 485, 492 (9th Cir. 1985) ("It is true that 'courts have regarded the evidence of
common errors in two similar works as the strongest evidence of piracy' [citation omitted]
but proof of common errors does not obviate the need for proving substantial similarity").
This approach to computer copyright cases is discussed in detail in J. Connolly and R.
Bryan, A Unified Theory for the Litigation of Computer Software Copyright Cases, 63 N.C.L.
REv. 563 (1985). The authors there urged that the plaintiff should not have the burden of
proving the two works to be substantially similar at all. Rather, the plaintiff should only need
show the accused work was "derived" from the plaintiff's work. Their approach, however,
disregards the fact that even where a plaintiff accuses a work of being "derived" from plain-
tiff's (and thus violating plaintiff's exclusive right under § 106(2) "to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work") rather than being a "copy" (in violation of plain-
tiff's exclusive right under § 106(1) "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies"), the
plaintiff must still show that the accused "derivative work" is itself "substantially similar" to
plaintiff's work. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied,
105 S. Ct. 1753; Berkic v. Crieghton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct.
85 (1985) ("If the plaintiff cannot show a substantial similarity between the defendants' work
and his own, he cannot prevail on a claim for alleged violations of his right to prepare deriva-
tive works.")
123. See, e.g., Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485,
492 (9th Cir. 1985).
124. Universal Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3rd Cir. 1975); Jackson v. Wash-
ington Monthly Co., 481 F. Supp. 647 (D.C.D.C. 1979). (Defendant's copying of two
sentences from plaintiff's work did not render the works so substantially similar as to consti-
tute infringement); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (apparent copying of
isolated passages in historical novel insufficient to constitute infringement).
125. See infra notes 165 to 170 and accompanying text.
126. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
127. As noted in Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 530 F.
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The nature of the two Microcodes guaranteed that Intel, after
translation, would be able to show some similarities. Both the Intel
Microcode and the portion of the NEC Microcode devoted to exe-
cuting the 8086/8088 instruction set consist in total of about five
hundred lines; the average length of the microsequences is short:
about six lines. The portions of the NEC Microcode challenged by
Intel are simple and even shorter than the average. Intel claimed
that 54 of 88 sequences are substantially similar. 128  These 54 se-
quences averaged in length slightly less than four lines each. 129
As is discussed infra,130 NEC's position, corroborated by notes
written by Intel's expert,13 1 was that the simpler sequences would
inevitably be similar. However, virtually all of Intel's evidence of
similarities related to these simpler sequences. Hence, that evidence
could not show that the protected expression, if any, contained
Supp. 1187, 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983), such analysis requires
that courts "distill the protected parts of a work from the unprotected".
See also, Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485 (9th
Cir. 1985).
[Plaintiff] argues that the ordinary reasonable observer would find that the cat-
alogs are virtually indistinguishable. This misses the point, What is important
is... whether the very small amount of protectible expression in Cooling Sys-
tems catalog is substantially similar to the equivalent portions of Stuart's cata-
log. Id. at 492-493.
128. Intel Ex. ABZ.
129. NEC Ex. 405.
130. See infra notes 147 through 164 and accompanying text.
131. During discovery, NEC succeeded, over Intel's objection, in obtaining notes written
by Intel's expert, Dr. Patterson, which became Intel Ex. R. Those notes repeatedly corrobo-
rate NEC's position, stating at various points that the expert would have to examine the
longer routines in order to find any meaningful evidence of copying, because the shorter
routines, being so highly constrained, must inevitably be similar.
The following are a few examples from Dr. Patterson's notes:
-"How can we tell what happened? I tried looking at the V20 microcode to
see (a) if there were strange short sequences and (b) if the long sequences look
as if they were copied. With emphasis on performance and limited complexity
of most 8086 instructions and limited choices in similar microarchitecture,
many sequences should look the same (factoring out the NEC changes to the
microarchitecture)."
--"Given the similarities of the microarchitectures, for some simple 8086 in-
structions, there is only one efficient way to do the microroutines in both
machines."
--"Argument: microarchitectures are similar, instruction sets are identical,
given similarities how can you tell if there was copying or if there was good
engineering on both sides? Problem: in those circumstances, good engineers
would lead to virtually identical microcode."
Although during Intel's direct case, Dr. Patterson attempted to downplay the signifi-
cance and dispute the accuracy of these "early impressions," he later, during Intel's rebuttal
to NEC's case, finally had to concede the constraints imposed on the shorter sequences. Tr.
XX 2775:4-9; 2803:14-20.
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within the Intel Microcode, when taken as a whole, was substan-
tially similar to the NEC Microcode. Moreover, simply on a com-
mon sense level, Intel never explained why NEC would copy the
shorter, simpler sequences, but not the longer sequences which are
more difficult to create independently.
Although Intel's expert testified that the 54 sequences were
substantially similar, he seemed to equate that term with any simi-
larity, whether inherent or not. This occasionally led to bizarre re-
sults. For example, Dr. Patterson was able on the same sequence to
find the NEC version "substantially similar" to Intel's,132 while at
the same time observing that the NEC routine was "quite different"
from the Intel routine13 and "not like [the] 8086 at all." 134 This
strange logic which can make the same microcode both quite differ-
ent and substantially similar is discussed below.135
A few illustrations will show the nature of the similarities re-
lied on by Intel in lieu of substantial similarity of protected expres-
sion. For example, there is a sequence, "RESET", in both the NEC
and Intel machines in which six specific registers are initialized
(that is, set to a specific starting value, either a zero or a one). The
only choice available to the microcode designer is the order in
which the registers are initialized; moreover, the theoretically possi-
ble orders emphasized by Intel are in reality significantly restricted
by the functioning of the hardware. 36 The two RESET sequences,
after being translated into a common language, are as follows:
NEC INTEL
DSO=0 b=0 NOP(a) DSO=O QHLD
flag=0 QHLD PS=bus
PS=bus PC=0 QINI
PC=0 QINI flag=0
DS1=0 ENDN MFS DSI =0
SS=0 SS=O RNI
Without considerable background and explanation, a trier of
fact could not rationally decide whether the NEC sequence is sub-
stantially similar in protected expression to the Intel sequence. To
decide that question one must understand the sequences, the other
132. LOOPZ, Intel Ex. ABZ.
133. Intel Ex. R, p. 7598.
134. Intel. Ex. R, p. 7593.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 138-140.
136. Tr. XII 1903:25-1907:11.
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possible orders in which the instructions might be performed and,
most importantly, what effect architectural constraints impose on
alternative RESETs, or, to state it another way, to what degree a
noncopied RESET might appear different.137 Yet, Intel made little
effort to show that a noncopied RESET would be materially differ-
ent from NEC's. Instead, Intel argued that NEC, in an earlier un-
used version of its Microcode, had copied Intel's RESET sequence.
Because the version NEC used was "derived" from that earlier
copy, Intel argued, it too is a "copy" and therefore "substantially
similar". 138
At times, the similarities found by Intel's expert completely ig-
nored the actual NEC Microcode. For example, there is a very sim-
ple sequence in both the NEC and Intel Microcodes that generates
"1" and puts it in a temporary register. Even though the operation
is simple, however, the NEC and Intel Microcodes perform the op-
eration differently. NEC generates the "1" directly. Intel generates
137. As pointed out in Cooling Systems, two works may be virtually indistinguishable to
the "ordinary reasonable observer" without being "substantially similar" if the similarities
are primarily unprotectible or merged expression. Cooling Systems & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart
Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d at 492-493 (9th Cir. 1985).
138. Intel Amended Proposed Finding No. 31(a). Intel never explained precisely what
NEC copied. Apparently the order in which the registers are initialized is the claimed ex-
pression, but if so, NEC's order is different.
This approach by Intel of looking to earlier, different versions of the NEC Microcode to
show "substantial similarity" between the NEC and Intel Microcodes, in addition to its in-
herent absurdity, is plainly contrary to well-established law.
"Plaintiff originally listed 1 points of similarity, based on a comparison of his
script with the defendant's original two scripts. Seven of the allegedly similar
scenes or phrases were, however, not incorporated in the film as shown on
television. Since the ultimate test of infringement must be the television film as
produced and broadcast, not the preliminary scripts, we have confined our
analysis to the remaining eleven allegedly similar scenes which were in the film
as produced and broadcast."
Fuld v. National Broadcasting Co., 390 F. Supp. 877, 882, n.4, (S.D.N.Y., 1975). See also,
Davis v. United Artists, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722, 724, n.9, (S.D.N.Y., 1982).
The issue is whether the final version of the allegedly infringing work, the version distrib-
uted to the American public, is substantially similar to the copyrighted work. Because no
amount of similarity in an earlier version can make the work in issue more or less similar to
the copyrighted work, earlier versions are irrelevant to this issue.
The Ninth Circuit has taken this rule one step further. In See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141
(9th Cir. 1983), the trial court had granted summary judgment for defendant because it
found, as a matter of law, a lack of substantial similarity. Plaintiffargued that this ruling had
precluded him from discovering earlier drafts of defendant's work, which plaintiff argued
might have reflected copying from plaintiff's work which was disguised or deleted in later
drafts. In upholding the summary judgment and thus preventing plaintiff from discovering
defendant's earlier drafts, the Ninth Circuit ruled that "copying deleted or so disguised as to
be unrecognizable is not copying." Id. at 142. Thus, under the Ninth Circuit view, earlier
versions are not merely irrelevant to the issue of substantial similarity, but they are not even
properly discoverable on that issue.
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it indirectly. After translation by Intel, the companies' respective
sequences appeared as follows:
NEC INTEL
I -+ TMPBL; SUSP; CR --+ OPR; UNC(5);
JUMP(02)
Despite the obvious differences, Intel's expert concluded that
NEC used the Intel sequence in developing the NEC sequence.
Thus, even though it was different, because in his view it was cop-
ied, it became substantially similar.
1 39
Under Intel's theory, it is hard to imagine how NEC's se-
quence could be made noninfringing. The "1" is required. NEC's
sequence is different from Intel's in the only substantial way possi-
ble: the only operation performed, generating "1", is done in a dif-
ferent way. Because Intel's expert thought Mr. Kaneko used the
Intel Microcode to produce different microcode, the resulting
microcode automatically became substantially similar no matter
how different it was in reality."4
Another of Intel's claimed "smoking guns" clearly shows the
difference between similarities of the sort found by Intel and the
substantial similarity in protected expression required for a finding
of infringement. There is only one place in both the V20/V30 and
8086/8088 where the microcode differs between the 8-bit and 16-bit
versions because of a difference in the respective chip designs. Intel
claimed that, had a different hardware design been chosen, the same
block of microcode could have been created to work on both the 8-
bit and 16-bit versions of the parties' respective devices. Therefore,
merely because the same microcode could not be used, Intel labeled
the design a "hardware bug" which was contained in both the V20
and 8088. The difference in microcode required by the 8088 hard-
ware was thereupon characterized by Intel's expert as a "patch"
around this bug. NEC had adopted the same hardware design, and,
of necessity, had the same difference in microcode between its 8-bit
and 16-bit devices (i.e., the same "patch"). To Intel's expert, this
139. Tr. III 430:6 - 431:1.
140. Intel's expert had inadvertently translated the wrong NEC code, that is, an interme-
diate version, rather than the allegedly infringing work. The sequence in the version actually
used by NEC in the V20/V30 and which appears in the text above, is less similar to the Intel
sequence than NEC's earlier unused version had been. NEC Ex. 179A. But to Intel, such a
change did not matter. Once a sequence was classified as "substantially similar" (i.e., Dr.
Patterson thought it was "copied") changes could not make it less "substantially similar".
This approach, as noted above, is contrary to well-settled law. See supra note 138.
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was convincing evidence of copying, apparently on the theory, not
supported by the facts, that NEC designed the hardware containing
the bug only after the microcode had been designed.' 4 ' However,
all relevant witnesses, including both parties' experts, as well as the
creator of the Intel "patch", agreed that, given the hardware, the
microcode employed by both companies was reasonable.142 Any
good engineer would produce similar microcode in similar
circumstances. 143
Intel did not limit its search for similarities which it could urge
evidenced copying to a comparison of individual sequences. For
example, Intel also argued that the existence of some similar group-
ings by the Intel and the NEC microcode designers of more than
one macroinstruction in a single microsequence constituted evi-
dence of copying. However, as both NEC's expert and an Intel en-
gineer testified, it would normally be expected that some of the
groupings would be the same, while others would be different, sim-
ply as a result of good engineering.'" Even Intel's expert agreed
that if he had created the NEC Microcode, some of the challenged
groupings would probably have been the same. 145
141. This theory was contrary to the facts. A full enumeration of the factual errors and
faulty assumptions that led to Dr. Patterson's conclusion is beyond the scope of this article.
It is sufficient to note that Intel confused circuit design with hardware specification. Mr.
Kaneko did not have to know every detail of the final hardware design to produce the NEC
Microcode. Tr. III 461:4-15. The NEC hardware had already been specified by Mr. Kaneko
so he knew full well how the hardware would behave, long before circuit design was com-
pleted. That is all a microcode designer needs.
142. Tr. XVI 2320:25-2321:5; XX 2810:16-23; IX 1426:13-1428:7. Moreover, NEC wit-
nesses testified that the Intel characterizations of "bug" and "patch" were unwarranted. Tr.
IX 1426:13-1428:7; XIII 1992:16-21.
143. For example, the "clean room" microcode, discussed infra, contains the same
"patch", to no one's surprise. See infra notes 180 to 187 and accompanying text. Even Dr.
Patterson conceded that there is "a good reason for the code to appear the way it did." Tr.
XX 2810:20-21.
144. Tr. IX 1399:2-25.
145. Tr. XX 2794:8-14. Interestingly, the percentage of groupings in the 80186
microcode section of the V-Series which are similar to the groupings in Intel's 80186
microcode is greater than in the 8086 section. NEC Ex. 375; Tr. IX 1400:1-1402:9. Yet,
Intel has never claimed that NEC copied the 80186 microcode and indeed NEC had no
access to it.
Another of Intel's more unusual copying theories also involved groupings. NEC, in an
earlier version of its Microcode, had grouped its byte/word sequences differently from Intel
to achieve better performance. Later, because of severe space constraints, Mr. Kaneko had to
forego that performance to save space and the microcodes became more similar. From those
facts, Intel's counsel hypothesized as follows:
Mr. Kaneko did start out to write faster code through different groupings. His
[first draft] microcode did have some different groupings and, as a result, it
gained some speed ....
[Later] Mr. Kaneko was instructed to cut back the use of space for the 8086
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Thus, Intel's direct case consisted of discussing a handful of
sequences in which its expert felt some similarity existed, or had
once existed,14 6 between the two Microcodes. NEC disputed
whether there was anything at all unusual in those similarities, or,
in some instances, whether there were similarities at all. Of greatest
importance, however, Intel made no effort, beyond the bare asser-
tion that 54 sequences were substantially similar, to explain what
protected expression it claimed NEC had appropriated.
4. The Absence of Substantial Similarity
NEC's response to Intel's copying claims was twofold. First
NEC showed that, contrary to Intel's assertions, the NEC
Microcode was developed independently of the Intel Microcode.
That evidence consisted primarily of the V20/V30 development his-
tory, showing that NEC revised its Microcode repeatedly over a
two year period, during which time many approaches were tried
and rejected before the NEC Microcode was finalized.147 Second,
NEC showed that those similarities which did exist between the
NEC and Intel Microcodes were inevitable given the similar
microarchitectures and same macroinstruction sets and so could not
constitute the substantial similarity of protected expression which is
necessary to a finding of infringement.148 The latter point, involv-
ing the merger doctrine, 149 raised the most difficult questions at
trial. The difficulty arose because, unlike Intel's fragmented evi-
dence of similarities, a reasoned substantial similarity analysis re-
instruction, and he did that by adopting the twelve out of thirteen Dlike Intel]
.... It was biased by knowledge that this is how Intel achieved its similar
space objective ... we know all about what Intel did. You spend all that time
studying it and you do the same thing, and the chances of doing it by coinci-
dence is pretty slim ....
Tr. XXI 2939:4-2941:18.
Apparently, because Mr. Kaneko "knew" what decisions Intel had made, he was not
allowed to make the same decisions. Intel's counsel even referred to Mr. Kaneko's knowl-
edge of the ItPD8086 as a form of "disability". Tr. XX13079:7-14. Intel's counsel seemed to
have overlooked the basic axiom that programmers are allowed to look at and learn from
each other's work. See supra note 121.
146. In some instances, the similarity relied upon by Intel had disappeared from the
NEC Microcode during the lengthy development process. See supra notes 136 to 138 and
accompanying text.
147. Development of the NEC Microcode took more than two years, measured from the
date work began, to the date the final preproduction changes were made, and a half-dozen
different versions were introduced at trial. For example, RESET, the sequence noted above,
was revised by NEC at least four times; see supra notes 136 to 138 and accompanying text.
148. See Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 492
(9th Cir. 1985).
149. See infra notes 165 to 170 and accompanying text.
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quires some understanding of microcode and its relationship to the
microprocessor of which it forms a part. 150
Microcode is not created in a vacuum, as one might write a
novel. Microcode performs a function, that of executing a set of
macroinstructions on a particular given microarchitecture or hard-
ware, and so is highly dependent on (i.e., constrained by) both of
those elements.
The 8086/8088 macroinstructions are published in the Intel
user's manual and allow programmers to write application pro-
grams for use on the microprocessors. The V20 and V30 were in-
tended, among other things, to be able to act as enhanced
substitutes for the Intel 8086 and 8088. As such, the macroinstruc-
tion set of the V-Series includes, as a subset, the macroinstruction
set of the 8086/8088. Intel has not claimed any copyright in its
macroinstruction set, which is in the public domain, and acknowl-
edges that NEC, like anyone else, is free to use those
macroinstructions. 1 51
Similarly, NEC used a microarchitecture which had many sim-
ilarities to Intel's, but which also includes significant additions, in-
cluding a dual bus, an effective address generator, a shifter and loop
counter, and random logic multiply and divide, all of which allow
the V-Series to outperform the 8086/8088. Intel has also recog-
nized NEC's right to use Intel's microarchitecture,1 2 which can be
protected, if at all, only under the patent laws1 53 and as mentioned
above, the parties are licensed under each other's patents.1 54
At the core of the NEC/Intel dispute is the amount of creative
freedom available to a microcode designer. Microcode is heavily
dependent on both the macroinstruction set and the microarchitec-
ture. Thus, a microcode designer is highly constrained in the
choices available to him in developing microcode for a particular
device. For many of the microsequences, which are generally the
shorter, simpler sequences, the available choices are very limited,
often amounting to no more than trivial variations. For example, as
150. Intel rested its direct case on the fifth day of the twenty-one day trial, having made
little effort to make the technology involved understandable to the Court. That burden thus
fell on NEC by default because a well-reasoned substantial similarity analysis requires such
understanding.
151. NEC Corp. v. Intel, 645 F. Supp. 590, 592 (N.D. Cal. 1986), Partial Finding of Fact
No. 15C.
152. Id., Partial Finding of Fact No. 15D.
153. See supra note 22.
154. But see infra notes 171 through 179 and accompanying text regarding Intel's "boot-
strap license" argument whereby Intel seeks to nullify this acknowledged right of NEC to use
Intel's patents by an improper extension of the copyright law.
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was pointed out by NEC's expert, Dr. Gideon Frieder, there are
only a limited number of ways in which one can add two numbers.
In contrast, as one moves to sequences which are longer and
more complicated, the choices available to the the microcode de-
signer become correspondingly greater. Consequently, given that
the NEC and Intel microcode designers were both working under
substantially the same constraints, one would expect a fair degree of
similarity in function between the two Microcodes, even in the ab-
sence of copying, especially in the shorter, simpler microsequences.
This is precisely the situation which was shown at the trial.
At the outset, it must be noted that much of the NEC
Microcode was not even alleged to be similar. The 8086/8088 in-
struction set consists of over 250 possible machine instructions.
These instructions are implemented in the 8086/8088 through 88
documented microsequences in the Intel Microcode. 15 5 At trial, In-
tel asserted that only 54 of 88 sequences were substantially similar.
In terms of total lines, these amounted to only about forty percent
of the microcode implementing the 8086/8088 instruction set.
Thus, before trial began, Intel had conceded that sixty percent of
the NEC Microcode was not similar.
NEC showed, however, that the allegedly similar forty percent
contained for the most part, short simple routines where, due to the
physical constraints, there was usually little or no choice available
to the microcode designer. On the other hand, the portion which
Intel conceded was different included all of the longer, more com-
plex routines. The average length of those sequences not on Intel's
list of substantially similar sequences is more than double the aver-
age length of the sequences which were alleged to be substantially
similar. The allegedly similar sequences averaged less than four
lines in length.15 6
NEC demonstrated these facts not by bare assertions by its ex-
pert, but by an extensive excursion into the world of the microcode
designer. NEC first presented to Judge Ingram a comprehensive
tutorial on what microcode is and how it works in the 8086/8088
and V-Series, followed by a painstaking analysis of the individual
155. See text at note 107 supra regarding the undocumented microsequence hidden by
Intel in the Intel Microcode which executes the "magic instruction."
156. NEC Ex. 375. Intel never explained why NEC would "copy" the simplest, easiest
routines, and not copy the longer, harder sequences. For example, an Intel engineer testified
that different versions of RESET could be created in a matter of minutes. Tr. III 540:22-
541:8. Of course, even the more complex sequences were not extraordinary. The same Intel
engineer testified "the algorithms used were very straightforward algorithms. They have
been around since the fifties." Tr. IV 557:10-12.
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sequences on Intel's list of 54, showing the constraints on NEC
which dictated the similarities.
The vast majority of these microcode sequences are four or
fewer lines long. For example, there are machine instructions called
"TEST eb, rb" and "TEST ew, rw" which are implemented by the
following microsequence:
NEC INTEL
a=RM; b=R; AND(a); ENDN P(M, TMPA, 1, LAND, TA, 0);
bus=ALUf; P(N, TMPB, 4, XX, NXT, 0);
P(S, XX, 4, XX, RN1, 1);
Intel's first step, of course, was to translate both Microcodes
into a hybrid common language thereby eliminating the differences
between the two Microcodes reflecting the NEC dual bus (a signifi-
cant difference between the two machines). Intel's translation of
TEST resulted in the following common language microcode: 157
NEC INTEL
M- TMPA; LAND(TA); NA-+ TMPA; LAND(TA);
-- TMPB; ENDN; IN TMPB; NXT;
S -*XX; F; S -+XX; F; RNI;
As one can see, when translated the two sequences are made to
appear very similar. On the other hand, given the simple nature of
the TEST operation, it would be surprising if the codes were not
similar in the way they function. 158 Because of the hardware used,
the only option or choice available to either Intel or NEC was
which temporary register ("TMPA" or "TMPB") to use. To Intel,
that was no choice at all. Intel's expert testified that in deciding
whether sequences were "substantially similar", the "selection of
particular temporary registers is not one of the things that influ-
ences my conclusions." 1 59 In short, in TEST, Intel had factored out
of its similarity analysis the only choice available to NEC, so that
157. NEC objects to the "translations" performed by Intel. See supra notes 106 to 110
and accompanying text.
158. The TEST instruction, as defined in the Intel manual, "performs the logical 'and'
[denoted in Intel's common language as "LAND(TA)"] of the two operands (byte or word)
[denoted in Intel's common language as "M" and "N"], updates the flags [denoted in Intel's
common language as "S" and "F'], but does not return the result [denoted in Intel's common
language as "XX"] ...." Initially, the contents of "M" and "N" had to be moved to tempo-
rary registers ["M - TMPA" and "N -+ TMPB", as denoted in Intel's common language] in
order to perform a logical "and".
159. Tr. III 426:15-18.
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no matter what NEC did Intel could claim the sequence was sub-
stantially similar.
In response to NEC's evidence that the similarities were inevi-
table, Intel first attempted to show that many alternatives existed
for several of the sequences which NEC claimed were constrained
by the hardware. The most elaborate and perhaps the most dra-
matic of these attempts was a list of over two hundred "alterna-
tives" generated by Intel engineers for one of the NEC routines. 160
Upon further analysis, however, it was shown 16 1 that twenty-four of
those alternatives would in fact not work on the V-Series, approxi-
mately one hundred and seventy were unreasonable and unprofes-
sional162, while only about eight were in fact reasonable
alternatives. However, each of those eight included only trivial var-
iations of the NEC sequence, involving mostly differences in the
choice of temporary registers. Accordingly, Intel's attack on con-
straints resulted in alternatives which were either nonfunctional,
unreasonable, or trivial variations of the actual NEC sequence. 163
Intel's alternatives themselves became highly probative evidence
that NEC often had little or no meaningful choice in the way in
which a microsequence could be created.'
160. MOV mem ace. Intel Ex. AGM.
161. NEC Ex. 427.
162. These unreasonable "alternatives" involved steps such as, while moving information
from one register to another, passing that information through the ALU and adding zero to
it. Even the creator of the Intel Microcode (called as a witness for Intel) testified that such an
operation was an error. Tr. III 483:17-20. This type of alternative would be akin to sug-
gesting, as an alternate way of traveling by car from San Jose to San Francisco, that the
driver exit the freeway at various points, circle a few side streets, and stop and restart the car
before continuing on the freeway from where he had exited. Such a circuitous route is not a
reasonable alternative. As stated by the court in Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 131 (E.D. Mich. 1979):
To cite an extreme, how many ways may one describe how to draw a circle
with a compass? To be sure, many outlandish methods using eccentric styles
could be conceived. But there is no societal value in that. For better it is to
narrow the protection to the first writer, in the interest of competition.
See also Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 492 (9th
Cir. 1985) ("Surely Cooling Systems cannot contend that Stuart, to escape a charge of copy-
right infringement, must restrict itself to producing a catalog not usable by those for whom it
is intended.") Clearly, Intel cannot force NEC to utilize outlandish microcode simply to be
different.
163. Dr. Patterson attempted to justify Intel's circuitous alternatives to another sequence
by positing that a microcode designer might add extra operations in the middle of a sequence
merely "to exercise the hardware." Tr. XX 2812:8-12.
164. One side effect of Intel's efforts to develop alternative microcode was to illustrate
how different the V20 and 8088 actually are. Although Intel's engineers were presumably
experienced with the Intel Microcode, they had a very difficult time developing debugged
NEC microcode. The longest NEC sequence Intel attempted to redesign was 14 lines, and
contained so many bugs the effort was abandoned. Intel Ex. ACZ; Tr. XIII 2010:8-2011:12.
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In sum, the evidence at trial showed that the microcode design-
ers often had few choices available. Where choices were available,
sometimes NEC made the same choice as Intel, and sometimes
made a different choice. Indeed, none of the 54 NEC routines on
Intel's list of substantially similar sequences is identical, even after
translation by Intel, to the corresponding Intel routine. Where a
greater number of choices were available to the NEC microcode
designer (i.e., in the longer, more complex routines) the sequences
were so different that Intel did not even allege similarities in these
sequences. This is all as one would expect of microcode developed
independently under the constraints imposed by the Intel macroin-
struction set and similar microarchitectures.
5. The Legal Significance of Inevitable Similarities
That a microcode designer is often highly constrained in his choices
by the macroinstruction set and the microarchitecture is relevant to
a copyright analysis in two respects. The first is the result of a legal
doctrine known as the merger doctrine. The second has to do with
the evidentiary weight to be accorded similarities between two
works.
The copyright law does not grant an author a monopoly over
the ideas expressed in his work; rather, only the author's particular
expression of those ideas is protected against copying.' 65 The idea
expressed by both the NEC Microcode and the Intel Microcode is
the execution of the 8086/8088 macroinstruction set on similar
microarchitecture.166
In cases where there are but one or a limited number of ways of
expressing a given idea, protecting the expression of that idea would
create de facto protection of the underlying idea. In this situation,
The only means Intel had of testing its alternative NEC microcode was to ask Mr. Kaneko,
the alleged infringer, if the alternatives would work on the V20/V30.
165. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954); 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (1977).
166. Intel did not agree that the unprotected idea included the microarchitecture. But
what is the microarchitecture if not "idea"? One cannot select microcode to move data from
"Register A" to "Register B" without first deciding that there will be two registers, "A" and
"B" and that there will be some means of moving data between them. Those elements of the
microarchitecture are certainly not part of the microcode's expression; rather they are part of
the idea being expressed. Before the Intel microcode designer could express the idea (i.e.,
operation) of moving data between "A" and "B" he must first have in mind the idea of those
registers and data paths, and surely NEC, in addressing the same functions, is entitled to have
the same idea in mind.
"One is always free to make the machine do the same thing as it would if it had the
copyrighted work placed in it, but only by one's own creative effort rather than by piracy."
SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829 (M.D. Tenn.
1985), quoting from the CONTU Report. See infra note 169.
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under the merger doctrine, the idea and the expression of the idea
are said to merge. Copyright protection does not extend to this
merged expression because such protection would afford the copy-
right owner a monopoly over the underlying idea. 167 Thus, anyone
can freely use the merged expression. Moreover, under the "scenes
a faire" doctrine, "similarity of expression ... which necessarily
results from the fact that the common idea is only capable of ex-
pression in more or less stereotyped form will preclude a finding of
actionable similarity."' 168 In the NEC v. Intel case, to the extent
that the idea of interpreting macroinstructions on a particular sort
of computer architecture can be expressed (in microcode) in only
limited ways, or in a more or less stereotyped form, all such expres-
sions merge with the underlying idea.'69 Quite apart from the
167. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1970).
"The copyright law protects expression of unprotectible ideas only insofar as is possible with-
out protecting the ideas themselves." Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc.,
736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984). An insightful analysis
of a substantial similarity/merger argument identical to that raised by NEC was provided by
the Second Circuit in a case involving rulebooks for a tabletop soccer game. Affiliated Hospi-
tal Products, Inc. v. Merdel Game Manufacturing Company, 513 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1975).
The court analyzed this issue on facts remarkably analogous to those in this case:
The issue that is squarely raised, therefore, is to what extent a copyright holder
can prevent a competitor from publishing a similar rulebook to the copyrighted
rulebook. No claim is of course made that appellant can protect the game of
Caroms or its variations which are in the public domain. The rules of the game
are perforce in the public domain as well as the game itself. Affiliated's copy-
right only protects Affiliated's arrangement of the rules and the manner of
their presentation, and not their content. Here, however, the simplicity of the
games makes the subject matter extremely narrow, and the distinction between
substance and arrangement blurs. On these facts we hold that Merdel,
although admitting to access and use of Affiliated's work, did not infringe Affil-
iated's copyright. Merdel did not copy Affiliated's rules verbatim, and indeed
its changes enhanced the clarity of the rules. This conclusion, based on the
facts here present, in no way affects the general rule, applicable in other situa-
tions, that upon a showing of access to copyrighted material, an alleged in-
fringer cannot escape liability for his appropriation through the introduction of
slight changes. [citation omitted] We are encouraged in this conclusion
through recognition of the fact that a contrary result would prevent publica-
tion of the rules of any simple game in the public domain unless the second
entrant in the field developed his rules solely through watching the game being
played; a result which would afford protection to the game itself.
Id. at 1188-89.
168. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] at 13-32 to 13-33 (1986). See
also Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976); Warner
Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 654 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1981).
169. The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
("CONTU") was created by Congress in 1974 as a part of the effort to revise comprehen-
sively the Copyright Laws. P.L. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873. Part of CONTU's charge was to
consider to what extent computer programs should be protected by copyright. CONTU is-
sued its Final Report in 1978 in which it recommended the continued copyrightability of
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merger doctrine, constraints limit the evidentiary weight to be ac-
corded similarities; no inference of copying can be drawn from inev-
itable similarities.
These considerations are quite important to the NEC v. Intel
case. Because the creator of the Intel Microcode was under severe
constraints imposed by the macroinstruction set and the
microarchitecture, the scope of copyright protection, if any, to be
afforded the Intel Microcode is very narrow and a near identity be-
tween the two Microcodes must be shown before infringement can
be found. 17
0
6. Intel's "Boot Strap License" Argument
Between Intel's expert's concession that the microarchitecture
offers limited choices, 71 and Intel's failure to produce dissimilar'72
reasonable alternatives to the Intel sequences, 173 Intel's response to
the merger doctrine gradually took a different shape. Ultimately
Intel tacitly admitted that a high degree of similarity in those se-
quences constrained by the architecture was inevitable, and shifted
the emphasis of its case to an argument, novel in intellectual prop-
erty law, that the constraints imposed on NEC should be disre-
computer programs and also recommended appropriate changes in 17 U.S.C §§ 101 and 117,
which changes were adopted by Congress verbatim. See, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula
International, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 524-525 (9th Cir. 1984). The CONTU Report recognized
the applicability of the merger doctrine to computer programs.
The "idea-expression identity" exception provides that copyrighted language
may be copied without infringing when there is but a limited number of ways
to express a given idea. This rule is the logical extension of the fundamental
principle that copyright cannot protect ideas. In the computer context this
means that when specific instructions, even though previously copyrighted, are
the only and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their later use by
another will not amount to an infringement.
• copyright protection for programs does not threaten to block the use of
ideas or of program language previously developed by others when that use is
necessary to achieve a certain result. When other language is available, pro-
grammers are free to read copyrighted programs and use the ideas embodied in
them in preparing their own works. This practice, of course, is impossible
under a patent system, where the process itself is protected, and difficult under
trade secrecy, where the text of a program is designed not to be revealed.
CONTU Report at pp. 50-51.
170. "Where idea and expression coincide, there will be protection against nothing other
than identical copying of the work." Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 1977).
171. See supra note 131.
172. In closing argument, Intel urged the Court to ignore the fact that its alternatives
were similar: "Who cares if they are similar?. .. And the fact that some of these, thousands
of variables in terms of rewrites, appear similar to each other, sure; so what? They are still
different from each other, too. That is the point." Tr. XXI 3071:23-3072:9.
173. See supra notes 160 to 164 and accompanying text.
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garded because they were self-imposed, that is, the result of NEC's
decision to employ a microarchitecture which was similar to that of
Intel. In other words, if similar hardware would necessarily result
in similar microcode, then, Intel claimed, NEC should not be per-
mitted to use similar hardware. Intel advanced this argument even
though Intel agreed that NEC had a right to employ similar
microarchitecture, and indeed had Intel's permission to so so under
the Patent Cross-License Agreement.
This became Intel's bootstrap license argument that NEC
should not be allowed to "bootstrap" its right to use hardware simi-
lar to Intel's hardware into a right to use microcode sequences
which are similar to those of Intel. Rather, NEC should have cho-
sen different hardware, which would have necessitated different
microcode. As Intels counsel stated in closing argument:
The point that we are making... is that if they had just done any
of these things differently, including made the architecture differ-
ently, Mr. Kaneko would have been liberated and he wouldn't
have had to have all of these, the microprograms that were sub-
stantially similar. Quite to the contrary. They would have been.
different, and that is exactly the point. 174
This line of argument was taken to its irrational extreme by
Dr. Patterson when he testified for Intel:
If we look at the first system specifications, we can see a lot of
similarities in the microarchitecture to the 8088.
Now, Dr. Frieder, in his analysis [just assumed] that what hap-
pened at the end was very many of the routines were very similar
just as a matter of coincidence, because they were constrained.
In my view, it is that [NEC] started at the disassembled code,
provided a microarchitecture that would allow them to refer to
this disassembled code, and copy the microprogram. 175
Dr. Patterson's hypothesis ignores reality. If NEC had started
with the Intel Microcode and set out to design a microarchitecture
which would allow NEC to use the Intel Microcode, surely NEC
174. Tr. XXI 3069:6-14. Note, however, that claiming different hardware will produce
different microcode is not the same as claiming different hardware will produce noninfringing
microcode. As noted supra, a "translation" can eliminate or minimize hardware differences.
See notes 106 to 110 and accompanying text. The NEC design has a number of differences
that Intel either disregarded in its translation (for example, the dual bus), or ignored in its
similarity analysis. Intel also ignored differences required by the hardware in deciding
whether two sequences were similar. Tr. XX 2836:10-17. If one adopts translation rules to
eliminate the hardware differences, any microcode implementing the 8086 instruction set can
be made to appear similar. A translation was simply easier for Intel to perform in this case,
because the microarchitectures were fairly similar.
175. Tr. XX 2843:16-2844:10.
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would have copied the longer, more complex sequences, the very
areas which are most difficult to create. Moreover, Dr. Patterson
himself stated in his notes that one must look to the longer se-
quences to find meaningful evidence of copying.176 Yet Intel admit-
ted that the longer sequences, to which one would look to detect
copying, were not similar at all.
Intel's bootstrap license argument also confuses the nature of
the merger doctrine. The expression that is merged is Intel's ex-
pression. Nothing NEC does can alter the scope of protection avail-
able to Intel. The constraints at issue, for purposes of merger, were
the constraints chosen by Intel, not NEC. The microarchitecture
used by NEC was relevant to merger only to the extent it happened
to be similar to that used by Intel. 177
The argument that, by some mysterious process, copyright law
prohibited NEC from using some of the same hardware or architec-
ture as Intel, even though NEC was licensed under Intel's patents to
use that hardware, comes closer to what this case is really about:
NEC has used (as it was entitled to do) a similar microarchitecture.
That was the alleged copying that actually concerned Intel.
Microcode can be developed afresh in a matter of a few weeks. 178
However, securing a de facto monopoly over the microprocessor
design via copyright law, without meeting the rigorous require-
ments of patent law, would be of great value to Intel. It would
extend copyright protection to the entire microprocessor hardware
architecture, without the safeguards associated with the patent sys-
tem, thereby dragging computer architecture into the black hole of
software copyright. 179
176. See supra note 131.
177. Of course the constraints imposed on NEC are relevant to another issue: whether
NEC copied. The constraints on NEC served to rebut any inference that similarities were
due to copying. For example, there were places where NEC made "space/performance"
tradeoffs similar to those made by Intel. NEC showed those similarities were the result of
constraints imposed by the NEC design, not copying.
178. See supra note 121.
179. See Copyright Protection: Legal Black Hole? Vol. 3, No. 8 COMPUTER LAW STRAT-
EGIST 3 (Dec. 1986), wherein it is observed that Judge Ingram's ruling that the Intel
Microcode is copyrightable, in combination with the recent decisions in Broderbund
Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986) and Whelan Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797
F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), "may define copyright protection into a legal black hole, sucking in
all aspects of a computer system, from the lowest microcode inseparable from the hardware,
to the 'look and feel' of the user interface." However, perhaps such pessimism is yet prema-
ture, as witnessed, for example, by the Fifth Circuit's recent rejection of Whelan in Plains
Cotton Cooperative Association of Lubbock, Texas v. Goodpasture Computer Service, Inc.,
807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987).
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7. NEC's Clean Room Microcode
Copyright law only forbids the copying of another's work, not
one's own independent development of a work even if that work
turns out to be identical to some earlier copyrighted work. 8 If
there is no access to the plaintiff's protected expression, there can
be no copying, and thus there can be no infringement. In the copy-
right context, a clean room 81 refers to an environment where the
creator of a new competitive work has no access to the protected
expression contained in the competitor's work, although the creator
can have access to the unprotected ideas contained in that competi-
tor's work.
NEC, as a matter of business caution, decided prior to the start
of trial to use such a clean room to produce a new microcode for the
V-Series. A substitute microcode (the Clean Room Microcode) was
developed within a relatively short time. 8 This new Clean Room
Microcode, developed by an outside consultant who was shielded
from all access to the Intel Microcode, has virtually the same degree
of similarity to the Intel Microcode as does the allegedly infringing
NEC Microcode. The same similarities, with only minor variations,
that Intel urged proved copying also exist in the Clean Room
Microcode. This is hardly surprising since these similarities were,
as was urged by NEC at trial, the result of the very limited number
of choices available to the microcode designer, rather than, as urged
by Intel, evidence of copying.
The Clean Room Microcode is most similar to the NEC and
Intel Microcodes, as one would have predicted, in the short, simple
sequences. For example, the RESETs183 (after translation) com-
pare as follows:
180. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954); Selle v. Gibb, 567 F. Supp. 1173, 1180
(N.D. Ill. 1983). Indeed such an identical work, if independently created, is itself protected
by copyright. Id. at 1182-83.
181. The concept of a "clean room," of course, is suggested by the phrase originally used
to describe a room used in the semiconductor manufacturing process in which outside con-
taminants such as dust particles were excluded to ensure the purity of the silicon being
processed within the room.
182. Development of the Clean Room Microcode took far less time than the trial itself.
183. See supra notes 136 to 138 and accompanying text.
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Clean Room NEC Intel
DSO=O QHLD DSO=O b=O NOP(A) DSO=O QHLD
Flag=O NOP(A) Flag=O QHLD CS=bus
DSl=0 MFS CS=bus PC=O QINI
CS=bus PC=O QINI Flag=O
PC=O ENDN QINI DSI=0 ENDN MFS DSI=0
SS=O SS=O SS=O RNI
TEST184 (after using Intel translation rules) provides another
example:
Clean Room NEC Intel
- TMPB; LAND(TA); -- TMPA; LAND(TA); M TMPA;LAND(TA)
TMPA; ENDN; IN -- TMPB; ENDN; N -- TMPB; NXT;
S -* XX; F; S - XX; F; S -- XX; F; RNI;
The sequences are nearly identical. The only difference is in
the selection of temporary registers which is basically a fifty/fifty
chance.
How does the clean room bear on the case? First, it will bring
the issue of substantial similarity back into focus, and will provide a
benchmark to show how non-substantially similar microcode would
appear. 85 Second, it will refute once and for all Intel's claims con-
cerning the kind of similarities that show copying by Mr.
Kaneko.'186 Third, it will bring to the fore the issue of architectural
similarities. The Microcodes are functionally similar because the
microarchitectures are similar and the macroinstruction sets are the
same.
What may then be at stake when this litigation resumes is the
entire notion of a clean room, and ultimately the limit to which a
microcode copyright can protect hardware design. If NEC prevails,
the scope of copyright protection, if any, for a work such as the
Intel Microcode, will be narrow, so as to protect against only works
that are similar in unexpected or unusual ways, i.e. where the crea-
tor has true freedom of choice. On the other hand, if Intel prevails,
the scope of a microcode copyright will be very broad, encompass-
184. See supra notes 138 to 140 and accompanying text.
185. Similarities which are the consequence of logical coding cannot constitute protected
expression. If two engineers working independently would likely produce very similar
microcode, then the scope of protection must be narrow. It is only that which is different
about the expression contained in the Intel Microcode that copyright protects, if anything.
186. Virtually all the similarities that Intel had claimed "proved" copying by NEC are
also in the Clean Room Microcode, which could not have been copied.
[Vol. 3
THE BL4CK HOLE OF COPYRIGHT
ing not only the Microcode itself, but foreclosing similar computer
architectures. This would necessarily mean that no one could make
a compatible machine, be it a microprocessor, personal computer or
mainframe computer, where the first machine's control function
was performed by copyrighted microcode. The copyright owner
would then have patent-like protection over the entire machine,
hardware and all, without the safeguards provided under the patent
law.18 7
IV. CONCLUSION
This law suit was begun by NEC to determine, judicially,
whether Intel should be permitted to deny to the market superior
products competitive with the 8086 and 8088 by an extension of the
scope of copyright protection when Intel has consciously decided
not to upgrade these two products to meet the needs of the market.
Monopoly rights were sought by Intel for the control portion of the
8086/8088 microprocessor in order to keep a better product from
the market. If Intel's position is sustained it is unclear who the
winner will be. Just as many important copyrights can be claimed
by foreign companies as by United States companies. But it is clear
who the loser will be: United States manufacturers of products us-
ing microprocessors who will be forced to pay whatever price com-
panies free from competition care to charge for inferior products;
and United States consumers to whom those prices will be passed
and who will be denied state-of-the-art products.
187. See supra notes 34 to 35 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
Microcode Formats
8086/8088 Format
Source Destination Type a b F
Source Dtation 0 0 Condition L0-,15, F
Source Destination 0 1 ALU Operation T Vp x F
Source Destination 1 0 0 qROUP1 GROUP2 F
AORSource Destination 1 1 0 A N SA R FACTO: F
Source Destination 1 0 1 3onditior TAG FI I I I I I I I I I I
Source Destination 1 1 1 Conditio , TAG F
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
V20/V30 Format
SOURCE1 DEST. 1 SOURCE2 D2 F W E TYPE a b c
SOURCE 1 DEST. 1 SOURCE2 D,2 F W E 0 0 ALUOperationkr p _
SOURCE1 DEST. 1 SOURCE2 D2 F W E 0 1 Condition o-15f I I I I I I I I I ! I I I , .15 ,
SOURCE' DEST. 1 SOURCE2 D2 F W E 1 1 INT. CTL VXT. CT SR
I I I I 67 I I I I I I I I 2829
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
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